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Substantive Due Process And The Criminal Law
MARINA ANGEL*
INTRODUCTION
Although the phrase "substantive due process" is shrouded in
mystery and has fallen into disrepute, this article will demonstrate
that substantive due process is a method of analysis which is at the
heart of the Supreme Court's constitutional review of state and
federal enactments. Given the primacy of substantive due process
analysis, it surprisingly has never been applied by name to criminal
enactments and punishments' despite recognition that the criminal
sanction is the most severe sanction our society can impose., In
recent years, however, the Supreme Court has increasingly empha-
sized substantive due process in ts criminal law decisions.3 This
article will first define substantive due process as a mode of consti-
tutional analysis, and then review its application by the Supreme
Court in three lines of cases: (1) cases dealing with the definition of
crime; (2) cases dealing with the differences between criminal and
civil proceedings; and, (3) cases dealing with our most severe crimi-
nal sanction, the death sentence.
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS As CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
An understanding of substantive due process as a mode of analy-
sis begins with an understanding of the Constitution's position in
* Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. B.A., Barnard College,
1965; J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 1969; LL.M., University of Pennsylvania Law
School, 1977.
1. This surprise was expressed as early as 1922 by Professors Laylin and Tuttle.
A comparison of the criminal with the civil cases reveals the rather astonishing fact
that the courts are much more inclined to apply the limitations of the due process
of law clauses to legislative acts imposing civil than to those imposing criminal
liability. It would seem that the opposite ought to be the rule, for surely the imposi-
tion of a criminal sentence is or may be far more oppressive upon the individual
than the imposing of a civil liability.
Laylin & Tuttle, Due Process and Punishment, 20 MICH. L. REV. 614, 624 n.13 (1922). See
also Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 107, 127.
2. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
3. The late Professor Packer was one of the first to note the emergence of substantive due
process analysis in the field of substantive criminal law. Packer, The Aims of the Criminal
Law Revisited: A Plea for a New Look at 'Substantive Due Process,' 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 490
(1971); Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HAav. L. REv. 1071 (1964); Packer,
Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 107; see also Dubin, Mens Rea
Reconsidered: A Plea for a Due Process Concept of Criminal Responsibility, 18 STAN. L. REv.
322 (1966).
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our political structure and of the role of the Supreme Court as the
final interpreter of that Constitution. Grounded in natural law
theory,4 the Constitution is itself a "higher law"5 which supersedes
any legislative or executive actions found by the Court to conflict
with its commands. Corollaries of positive' and natural law theories
are the doctrines of the police power and the due process clauses of
the fifth and fourteenth amendments. These clauses have become
repositories for a residum of natural law theory within the Consti-
tution. The Court has long held that the states, under the police
power,' have broad authority to enact laws necessary to protect the
health, safety, welfare and morals8 of their citizens. The police
power, however, is limited by the due process clause when it affects
4. Grant, The Natural Law Background of Due Process, 31 COLUM. L. REv. 56, 56-57
(1931) [hereinafter cited as Grant]; Ratner, The Function of the Due Process Clause, 116
U. PA. L. Rv. 1048, 1048-50 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Ratner]; Tribe, Foreword: Toward
a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 H~Av. L. Rav. 1, 7 n. 34 (1973).
5. Corwin, The 'Higher Law' Background of American Constitutional Law, (pts. 1-2), 42
Hs v. L. REv. 149, 365 (1928); see also Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch of Government
(1962); Grant, supra note 4.
6. Positive law theory holds that a valid law is any command of the sovereign. In America
today, given the changes in our constitutional structure such as the direct election of senators,
U.S. Const. amend. XVII, and the requirement of one man one vote, Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964), the sovereign is the majority of the populace. Thus, under positive law
theory, any law passed by the representatives of the majority would be valid.
7. See, e.g., Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law, 12 MICH. L.
REv. 247 (1914). Broad as the police power may seem, it still has internal limits. Basic to the
framers' notion of the Constitution as a higher law was the concept of the social compact.
The power of any government is determined and limited by the purpose for which that
government was created. Since the American government was created to preserve to individu-
als the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property, its ability to deprive an individual of these
rights is limited. Howe, The Meaning of 'Due Process of Law' Prior to the Adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 18 CAL. L. Rav. 583 (1930) [hereinafter cited as Howe]. As part of
the nineteenth century development of economic substantive due process, the doctrine of
vested rights came to the fore. Under that doctrine it was declared beyond the legislatures'
power to take from an individual rights which had vested under existing law. Id. at 590.
Under any circumstances, the doctrine of vested rights is a broad one, but under its broad-
est formulation, a vested right cannot be taken away at all by the state; under a narrower
formulation, it cannot be taken away unless it is for the greater good of the body politic. Id.
at 589; Ratner, supra note 4, at 1070-71. The first formulation can be seen as substantive due
process ends analysis, the most intrusive type of substantive due process analysis, and the
second as substantive due process means-ends analysis, whose intrusiveness depends on the
degree of relationship required in order to sustain the legislative enactment. See text accom-
panying notes 13-18 infra.
8. It has been argued that it is never proper for a state to limit private sexual conduct
between consenting adults. See, e.g., Packer, The Aims of the Criminal Law Revisited: A Plea
for a New Look at Substantive Due Process, 44 S. CAL. L. Rav. 490 (1971); Note, The
Constitutionality of Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1613
(1974). However, in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for City of Richmond, 403 F. Supp.
1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd mere., 425 U.S. 901 (1976), the Supreme Court affirmed without
opinion a lower court finding that a Virginia statute making sodomy a crime was constitu-
tional.
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fundamental rights. Under the dictates of that clause, the Supreme
Court seeks a reasonable basis for legislation,' by balancing the
needs of the individual against the needs of the majority of the
populace (the sovereign).
Since the due process concept of fundamental rights is not static
and evolves in the same way as the common law," legislative enact-
ments may be considered evidence of what rights are fundamental
in our society at any given time. Those legislative pronouncements
are not final determinants, however, since there would then be no
meaning left to the Constitution as a higher law. On the theory that
individual rights may be infringed for the greater good, and presum-
ing that a majoritarian legislature acts for the greater good, a bal-
ancing process that accords conclusive weight to legislative judg-
ment would mean that there would be little chance of a statute
being declared unconstitutional as violative of the higher law."
Thus, the basic tension is political and surfaces when there is a
disagreement between a legislature and the Court as to what consti-
tutes a fundamental right.
The Court, consisting of judges appointed for life, has used two
devices to relieve the political tension inherent in its position as the
final arbiter of what the Constitution prohibits, and the position of
the executive and legislative branches as the elected representatives
of the sovereign. First, it accords a presumption of constitutionality,
and therefore validity, to legislative enactments even if it is claimed
that they conflict with a specific section of the Constitution. Sec-
ond, it is reluctant to strike down legislation on the basis that it
conflicts with fundamental rights not specified in the Constitution,
but subsumed under the broad heading of due process of law.
State enactments, however, will fall under substantive due pro-
cess analysis in two situations: first, if the state's purpose (end) is
prohibited by a specific section of the Constitution, or, in the cases
which have caused the greatest controversy and have traditionally
been the only ones denominated substantive due process decisions,
a fundamental right inherent in the guarantee of due process;' 3 and
9. Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power and the Supreme Court, 40 HARv. L. Ray.
943, 955-56 (1927) [hereinafter cited as Brown].
10. See Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on the
Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HRAv. L. Rav. 1510 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Limits on the
Use of Interest Balancing].
11. See, e.g., Howe, supra note 7, at 609.
12. See Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, supra note 10, at 1527 nn. 75, 76.
13. The controversy surrounding substantive due process was revived by the Court's deci-
sions in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down Connecticut's prohibi-
tion on the use of contraceptives), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton,
19771
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second, even if the state's purpose (end) is not prohibited by the
Constitution, if the state's method (means) of achieving its purpose
(end) does not bear a constitutionally permissible relationship to
that end." Whichever aspect of substantive due process analysis is
applied, an initial determination of legislative purpose must be
made by the Court. 5
As part of the second type of substantive due process analysis
(means-ends), the requirement of a "least restrictive alternative" is
sometimes invoked." Under this approach, the scrutiny does not
end with a determination that the state's purpose may be proper
and that the means chosen are related to achieving that purpose. A
court using this type of analysis must determine whether there is an
alternative avenue available to the state which would be less restric-
tive of individual rights. If it is found that such an avenue exists,
the enactment will fall. The nexus required between means and
ends depends on the importance of the interest affected by the
legislation. Professor Tribe's concept of "structural due process"
typifies the most constraining approach to least restrictive analy-
sis: 7 not only must the legislative purpose be proper, and the rela-
410 U.S. 179 (1973) (regarding prohibitions on abortions). See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf:
A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Epstein, Substantive Due Process By
Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. REv. 159; Heymann and Barzelay, The
Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, 53 B.U.L. REv. 765 (1973); Emerson, Nine
Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. REv. 219 (1965); Kauper, Penumbras, Peripher-
ies, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 MICH.
L. REv. 235 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Kauper]; Comment, Roe and Paris: Does Privacy
Have a Principle?, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1161 (1974); see also Wellington, Common Law Rules
and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973).
14. These methods of substantive due process analysis have long been recognized. Brown,
supra note 9, at 954-55; Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical
Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 689, 703 n. 70 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Perry]; Tribe, Strictural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 269 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Tribe]; see also Grant, supra note 4; Howe, supra note 7; Ratner, supra
note 4; Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87
HARV. L. REv. 1 (1973).
The distinction between means and ends may not be as clear as it seems. As Professor
Ratner pointed out,
There is, of course, no sharp distinction between ends and means. In the inevitable
hierarchy of values that underlies a system of order, ends are means to more impor-
tant ends. Social problems are resolved not by the choice first of ends and then of
means, but by the fashioning of an ends-means pattern.
Ratner, supra note 4, at 1075 n. 155.
15. For a discussion of the problems of discovering and analyzing legislative purpose, see
Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205
(1970).
16. See Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Alternative Principle and Economic Due Process, 80
HAav. L. REv. 1463 (1967); Note, The Less Restrictive Alternative in Constitutional Adjudica-
tion: An Analysis, A Justification, and Some Criteria, 27 VAND. L. REV. 971 (1974); cf. Brown,
supra note 9, at 954-56.
17. Professor Tribe himself acknowledged this possibility.
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tionship between means and ends be the least restrictive of individ-
ual freedom generally, but a determination must be made as to
whether the legislative purpose is being furthered in each individual
case.
An individualized determination of whether a specific case comes
within the legislature's purpose may also be required by procedural
due process. Realistically, however, procedural due process analysis
may be identical to the second aspect of substantive due process
analysis. It is a means-ends approach to determine whether the
legislative purpose is being fulfilled in a specific case. The more
fundamental the individual interest involved in a case, the closer
the relationship between means and ends required and hence the
greater degree of procedural due process required. Since the imposi-
tion of the criminal sanction may result in the greatest loss to the
individual, i.e., stigmatization and involuntary loss of liberty, more
procedural protections are required to surround the process by
which criminality is determined in an individual case."'
Procedural due process, like means-ends analysis generally, pres-
ents a lesser interference with legislative judgment than the first
type of substantive due process analysis. If a violation of procedural
due process is found, the legislature's underlying purpose need not
be permanently stifled. The legislature can choose to enact new
procedures or establish a new means-end relationship which will
enable it to achieve its purpose.
Judicial Application of Substantive Due Process Analysis in
Criminal Cases
During the early history of our country, state and federal legisla-
tures were primarily concerned with issues surrounding economic
development and property rights. Therefore, it is not surprising that
the Court first used substantive due process analysis in its review
of legislation touching on these issues. 9 However, the resultant pol-
In some circumstances, one 'less restrictive altenative' available to the state may
of course be an individualized hearing based on the substantive state interest in
question.
Tribe, supra note 14, at 286 n. 51.
The system of structural due process that Professor Tribe advocates as a matter of constitu-
tional law is similar to the one suggested as a matter of rational policy by Professor Kenneth
Culp Davis in his book DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1971). Professor Davis
recommends a system which combines administrative policy making and "openness" in the
belief that open policy statements and precedents, individual hearings and findings of fact,
and judicial review will result in just individual decisions and the consistent application of
rational policy.
18. See notes 28-34 infra and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See generally Gunther, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 548-76 (1975); Perry, supra note 14, at 695-706.
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itical clash between the Court and the legislatures (culminating in
the Court-packing plan of 1937) compelled the Court to withdraw
almost completely from overt application of such analysis. Yet the
Court never actually repudiated substantive due process. In eco-
nomic cases, it has accepted virtually any legislative purpose and
found proper any relationship between means and ends.2"
Although substantive due process is a basic mode of constitu-
tional analysis, the Supreme Court has never expressly applied it
to criminal cases. It is only in recent years that the Court has even
applied a de facto substantive due process approach to resolve con-
stitutional questions arising in a criminal context. There are several
reasons for the court's reluctance to utilize a substantive due
process analysis in criminal cases. First, ascertaining legislative
purpose can be quite difficult in criminal law. While the primary
goal of the criminal law is the prevention of harmful conduct, it is
achieved through the use of secondary purposes-retribution, de-
terrence (specific and general), rehabilitation, and isolation. This
profusion of sometimes inconsistent legislative purposes presents
both theoretical and practical conflicts."'
Second, the Supreme Court historically had little opportunity to
It has not, however, commonly been noted that many of the statutes declared unconstitu-
tional on substantive due process analysis in purportedly economic cases, including the
statute in Lochner, carried criminal penalties.
20. The Court's retreat from economic substantive due process cases has been criticized.
A common criticism is that the Court did not provide any rational explanation for differen-
tiating between economic and non-economic cases. It is, in fact, extremely difficult to differ-
entiate between personal and economic rights. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the
Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 34; Curtis, A Modern
Supreme Court in a Modem World, 4 VAND. L. Rv. 427 (1951); Graham, Poverty and
Substantive Due Process, 12 Afuz. L. REv. 1 (1970); Hetherington, State Economic Regulation
and Substantive Due Process of Law, 53 Nw. U.L. Rav. 13, 226 (1958); Paulsen, The Persist-
ence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 MINN. L. Rav. 91 (1950); Stem, The
Problems of Yesteryear-Commerce and Due Process, 4 VAND. L. REv. 446 (1951); Strong,
The Economic Philosophy of Lochner: Emergence, Embrasure and Emasculation, 15 AIz.
L. Rav. 419 (1973); Note, Due Process and Social Legislation in the Supreme Court-A Post
Mortem, 33 NOrRE DAME LAw, 5 (1957); Note, Substantive Due Process in the States Re-
visited, 18 Owo S.L.J. 384 (1957).
The decision in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), holding that
Congress exceeded its authority under the commerce clause and violated the Tenth Amend-
ment when it extended the minimum wage and maximum hour provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act to almost all state employees, may indicate a reemergence of economic sub-
stantive due process. Justice Brennan, in an opinion joined by two of the three other dissen-
ters, stated:
We tend to forget that the Court invalidated legislation during the Great Depres-
sion, not solely under the Due Process Clause, but also and primarily under the
Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment.
Id. at 868 (Brennan J., dissenting).
21. See note 76 infra and accompanying text.
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deal with cases raising criminal law issues. Originally, Congress was
perceived as having limited jurisdiction over crime;12 the definition
of crime and the imposition of the criminal sanction were considered
matters most within the states' police power. Even over matters of
criminal procedures, the Supreme Court's jurisdiction has, until
recently, been limited. The Bill of Rights was first interpreted to
apply exclusively to the federal government2 Not until the passage
of the fourteenth amendment in 1868 was it argued that the rights
granted in the first eight amendments were enforceable against the
states.2 4 It was in 1932 that the Court finally held that state criminal
procedures were limited by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 25 The vast expansion of individual procedural rights in
criminal cases took place between 1932 and 1970.21 However, by the
time state criminal cases began to be reviewed by the Supreme
Court in the 1930's, substantive due process had been discredited
as a legitimate mode of constitutional analysis. Since the specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights are largely procedural in nature, and
because of the "demise" of substantive due process analysis, the
emphasis has been on the procedures required in criminal cases and
not on the substance of the criminal laws being implemented. 7
At the same time that the Supreme Court was drawing back from
the use of substantive due process analysis in the economic field, it
was beginning to decide civil rights and civil liberties cases on two
22. See Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutors' Discretion, 13 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 64 (1948); Stem, The Commerce Clause Revisited-The Federalization of
Intrastate Crime, 15 ARIz. L. REv. 2171 (1973).
23. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
24. In the Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872), the Court rejected the
argument that the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment was meant
to secure to individuals against encroachment by the state governments the protections which
the first eight amendments guaranteed against encroachment by the federal government.
25. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (limited right to counsel in a capital case).
26. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (coerced confession); Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary evidence rule); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962) (prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963) (right to counsel); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (privilege against self-
incrimination); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right to confrontation); Klopfer v.
North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (speedy trial); Washington V. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967)
(compulsory process); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (jury trial); Benton v. Mary-
land, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (double jeopardy).
27. But see Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Justice Douglas' opinion for the
Court held invalid, on equal protection grounds, an Oklahoma statute which provided for
compulsory sterilization after a third conviction for a felony involving moral turpitude but
which excluded certain white collar felonies such as embezzlement. Justice Douglas' opinion
is an example of substantive equal protection analysis. See note 35 infra and accompanying
text. Justice Stone's concurring opinion relied on a pure substantive due process analysis to
hold the statute unconstitutional.
1977]
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related grounds: first, as mentioned above, on procedural due pro-
cess grounds, and second, on equal protection grounds. In recent
years, a third ground has been successfully asserted-the right to
privacy. On their faces, the first two grounds emphasize procedural
and not substantive issues, and therefore appear to have no connec-
tion with substantive due process analysis as developed in the eco-
nomic context. However, as will be seen, the form of constitutional
analysis used in these cases, as well as in the later cases involving
privacy, was actually one of substantive due process.
Procedural Due Process as Substantive Due Process
The process used by the Court to decide whether a procedural
right guaranteed by the first eight amendments in federal criminal
cases was enforceable against the states was substantive due process
analysis. When the Supreme Court began to review state criminal
cases, a basic split developed among its members with Justices
Black and Frankfurter emerging as leaders of two different schools
of thought. 28 Black advocated the position that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment was intended to incorporate the
first eight amendments of the Constitution, making them applica-
ble to the states in the same way they were applicable to the federal
government. Frankfurter advocated a case by case approach in
which the Court would determine whether a claimed right was so
fundamental as to be required under a basic notion of due process.,,
Although a majority of the Court never adopted Justice Black's
incorporationist approach, the period from 1949 to 1970 saw most
of the criminal procedural safeguards specified in the Bill of Rights
applied to the states on the basis of the fundamental fairness re-
quired by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment."0
Thus, by focusing on the purportedly fundamental nature of crimi-
nal procedural protections, the Court's approach in determining
which protections were applicable to the states by the due process
28. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
29. Justice Frankfurter himself noted the influence of the "natural law" tradition on his
interpretation of the requirements of due process. 332 U.S. at 65. Professor Ratner observed:
The terms sense of justice, fundamental principles, rights fundamental to the
American scheme of justice, traditions and conscience of the people, basic civil
rights, fair play, concept of ordered liberty, decency and heritage, are modem
designations for the natural rights of man. They are labels, not standards for deci-
sion, suggesting long-range community values perceived by the judiciary but not
necessarily reflected by the Constitution. Values thus labeled have become consti-
tutional limitations on governmental authority, apparently to be balanced against
the social benefits of regulation.
Ratner, supra note 4, at 1057.
30. See note 26 supra.
[Vol. 9
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clause was "the blood brother of natural law in the area of substan-
tive due process. '"'
Since the mid-1960's, the Court has faced the question of whether
procedural rights guaranteed by the due process clause to criminal
defendants were also guaranteed to individuals threatened with
deprivation of their liberty through non-criminal proceedings.
These alternative systems, such as juvenile court and civil commit-
ment, are designed as rehabilitative alternatives to the criminal
justice system. The Court examined the basic purpose or purposes
of the criminal law as contrasted to the basic purpose or purposes
of these alternative systems, and attempted to define the difference
between criminal and civil proceedings. The Court thus used sub-
stantive due process analysis in considering the constitutionality of
legislation involving alternative systems for dealing with social devi-
ance by analyzing the legislative purposes in establishing such sys-
tems and determining whether the means used by the legislatures
were permissibly related to the purported goals.
The Court's concern with the procedural safeguards surrounding
the process whereby an individual is deprived of liberty (whether by
means of the criminal process or an alternative rehabilitative sys-
tem) has underlined a new emphasis in our society on personal
freedom. Although the Court has never specifically stated that the
right to be free from unjust criminal incarceration and criminal
stigmatization is a fundamental right calling for the strictest consti-
tutional scrutiny, such a holding is implicit in its decisions regard-
ing the procedural protections surrounding a criminal trial. 31 It is
only in recent years that a discrepancy has been noted in the Court's
reviewing the procedural aspects of criminal cases and not the sub-
stantive content of the criminal laws themselves. 3 There are refer-
ences in the Constitution to crime and punishment,3 but the Bill
31. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and
Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 335 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Kadish]; accord, Kauper, supra
note 13, at 237; c. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards:
Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YA.E L.J. 221 (1973).
32. The Bill of Rights is concerned primarily with limitations surrounding the imposition
of the criminal sanction. The impact of the Court's finding such limitations applicable to the
states by reason of the fundamental fairness required by the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment has already been noted. It is also significant that in In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358 (1970), the Court held, on the basis of the due process clause alone, that proof
beyond a reasonable doubt was required in criminal cases and juvenile delinquency proceed-
ings.
33. Kadish, supra note 31, at 319; Packer, Making the Punishment fit the Crime, 77 HARV.
L. REv. 1071 (1964); Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. Rav. 107, 127.
34. See reference to sections collected in Hart, The Aims of The Criminal Law, 23 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 404 n. 13 (1958).
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of Rights deals primarily with the procedures surrounding the trial
of a criminal case. Substantive limits on the power of the states and
federal government to enact criminal statutes must therefore be
found in the broad wording of the due process clause and, to a
degree, in the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment. These methods require the application of sub-
stantive due process analysis.
Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process
As with procedural due process, equal protection also seems more
concerned with procedure than substance. Nevertheless, the strik-
ing similarity in practice between substantive due process analysis
and the equal protection analysis of recent cases has led to the use
of the term "substantive equal protection. '35 The similarity begins
when one notes that it is not a denial of equal protection for a state
to classify if the classification bears an appropriate relationship to
a proper state purpose. As a result, there has been an increased
focus in equal protection cases on the state's purpose for a classifica-
tion. This is especially true when either a suspect classification 31 or
a fundamental interest37 is involved. In such cases, a strict relation-
ship between means and ends, the classification and the purpose,
is required. Thus, equal protection analysis parallels substantive
due process analysis in both its aspects.
Right to Privacy and Substantive Due Process
Deprivation of liberty results in the deprivation of another sub-
stantive right-the right to privacy. The Court has of late recog-
nized new areas of personal privacy where the government cannot
intrude at alps and others where it can intrude only to a limited
35. The term substantive equal protection was probably first coined by Professors Tuss-
man and tenBroek in their article The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341,
361-65 (1949). See Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAmv. L. REv. 1 (1972); Karst, Invidious Discrimi-
nation: Justice Douglas and the Return to the 'Natural-Law-Due Process Formula,' 16
U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 716 (1969); Karst and Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telephase of Sub-
stantive Equal Protection, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 39; Note, Developments in the Law-Equal
Protection, 82 HAav. L. Rav. 1065 (1969).
36. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); McLaughlin v. Flor-
ida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (race); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (ancestry).
37. See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (right to vote); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right of interstate travel); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (rights
guaranteed by the first amendment); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to
procreate).
38. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (private possession of obscene material);
[Vol. 9
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extent and only with good reason. 9 Early cases such as Meyer v.
Nebraska ° and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,4' decided during the
heyday of economic substantive due process, broadly defined the
liberty interests protected by the due process clause. Those deci-
sions held that certain restrictions on family and parental rights
were beyond the power of the state even though such rights were not
specifically recognized in the Constitution. These early cases are
increasingly being relied on by the Court42 and provided precedent
for the landmark decision in Griswold v. Connecticut." Although
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (the giving of information regarding, and the
use of, contraceptive devices).
39. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (abortion);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (bugging and wiretapping of private conversa-
tions).
40. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). The statute made it a misdemeanor to teach in any school a
modem language other than English to any child who had not graduated from the eighth
grade. During the course of its opinion, the Court stated:
While. this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guar-
anteed, the term has received much consideration and some of the included things
have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from
bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of
the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a
home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law
as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
Id. at 399.
41. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). The statute made it a misdemeanor for a parent to fail to send a
child between eight and sixteen years of age to public school. The Court struck down the
statute:
Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska . . . we think it entirely plain that the
Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control. As often hereto-
fore pointed out, rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by
legislation which has no reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency
of the State. The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this
Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children
by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not
the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have
the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations.
Id. at 534-35. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Court sustained the claim of
Amish parents that their convictions under a compulsory school attendance law violated the
free exercise clause of the first amendment as made applicable to the states by the fourteenth
amendment and rights recognized in Meyer and Pierce.
42. The Court relied on Meyer in Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), to hold that a
liberty interest protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment was in-
volved when school authorities punished a child for misconduct by paddling.
43. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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the right to practice contraception is not specifically granted by the
Constitution, Griswold held unconstitutional a Connecticut crimi-
nal statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives and the giving of
information, instruction or medical advice on methods of preventing
conception. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, sought to take
the decision out of the classic substantive due process mold and to
make it more objective by tying it to a zone of privacy created by
"penumbras and emanations" formed by various specific guaran-
tees of the Bill of Rights. It is questionable whether Justice Doug-
las's approach achieved anything that a pure substantive due pro-
cess approach, the approach used by Justice Harlan in his concur-
ring opinion, could not achieve."
Eighth Amendment and Substantive Due Process
Although not calling it by name, the Supreme Court has also
applied substantive due process in eighth amendment cases. For
instance, the court normally relies on that amendment's ban on
cruel and unusual punishment rather than the due process clause
to determine the propriety of state purposes for imposing the crimi-
nal sanction as well as to determine the appropriate relationship
between a specific sanction and the purposes of the legislature. In
Robinson v. California," the Court found an eighth amendment
limitation on the state's ability to define criminality. The Court
concluded that the eighth amendment prohibits the imposition of
criminal sanctions in the absence of a voluntary act.4" The minimum
44. If Justice Douglas was trying to use a more objective approach than that possible
under substantive due process in order to avoid the type of political clash that followed the
Court's economic substantive due process decisions, he has been criticized as not succeeding.
Professor Kauper has pointed out that the emanations and penumbra theory could just as
easily have been applied in economic substantive due process cases. Although liberty of
contract is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, the Constitution does protect
against the impairment of the obligations of contract and against expropriation of property
without compensation. "[Tihe Court is applying essentially the same process as that used
in the fundamental rights approach, but dignifying it with a different name and thereby
creating the illusion of greater objectivity." Kauper, supra note 13, at 253. See generally,
Heymann and Barzelay, supra note 13; Ely, supra note 13; Emerson, supra note 13; Epstein,
supra note 13; Perry, supra note 14.
45. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
46. The Court's attempts to place limits on the substantive criminal law by use of the
eighth amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments rather than the due
process clause have been noted by Professors Packer and Dubin.
Under one label or another, it is apparent that the Supreme Court is beginning to
develop some notions of substantive due process about criminal legislation. Stan-
dards of rationality and fairness for the legislative invocation of the criminal sanc-
tion can be seen gradually and haltingly to emerge. 'Substantive due process' is a
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standards established by Robinson can be contrasted with the
Court's decisions regarding the extreme end of the criminal sanction
spectrum-the legislatively ordained situations in which the death
penalty can be imposed.
In the 1976 decisions regarding the death penalty, the Court con-
cluded that due to the extraordinary nature of the penalty, death
can be imposed only when rendered subsequent to proceedings
which allow the incorporation of individualizing devices. These
cases ensure that the imposition of death fulfills the purported pur-
poses of the criminal law in a specific case.47 In so doing, the Court
engaged in classic substantive due process analysis. First, the Court
sought the purposes for which criminal punishment is imposed in
order to determine their propriety. Second, it determined whether
the death sentence fulfilled any of the purported purposes. Finally,
the Court asked whether less drastic alternatives, such as a life
sentence or the imposition of death only in individual cases, were
constitutionally required where they more directly fulfilled the pur-
poses of the criminal law.
The Court's application of substantive due process analysis under
the guise of the eighth amendment is punctuated by the Court's
exclusive reliance on the due process clause in related decisions
regarding the constitutionality of the death sentence. In McGautha
v. California,4" an early attack on the constitutionality of the death
sentence, it was argued that the due process clause required stan-
dards for the imposition of the death sentence and bifurcated trials
phrase to which the Court has been said, by one who should know, to have an
'allergy,' although the allergy seems to be more to the phrase than to the concept.
In the search for euphemism, the eighth amendment's proscription of 'cruel and
unusual punishments' has been winning judicial favor. Robinson v. California may
have established in the eighth amendment a basis for invalidating legislation that
is thought inappropriately to invoke the criminal sanction, despite an entire lack
of precedent for the idea that a punishment may be deemed cruel not because of
its mode or even its proportion but because the conduct for which it is imposed
should not be subjected to the criminal sanction.
Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HAav. L. Rav. 1071, 1071 (1964). Professor
Dubin noted:
The Court's decision in Robinson v. California has led to growing speculation that
the eighth amendment may be used in future cases as a basis for bringing principles
of criminal responsibility within the express protection of the Constitution. The
argument would be that the ban on cruel and unusual punishment does historically
represent, at least in spirit, the framers' desire to provide a constitutional sanctuary
for such principles, and such a conceptualization of the eighth amendment as the
just punishment guarantee is admittedly an attractive idea. The better, more can-
did view, would nonetheless seem to be that those principles are due process guar-
antees.
Dubin, supra note 3, at 392-93.
47. See notes 313-21 supra, and accompanying text.
48. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
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on the issues of guilt and punishment. Justice Harlan, writing for
the Court, rejected both contentions. However, when Furman v.
Georgia" was decided in 1972, a majority of the Court agreed that
a capital sentencing scheme having no standards and providing for
no appellate review violated the eighth amendment's ban on cruel
and unusual punishments. The majority reasoned that death is such
an extraordinary punishment that its imposition in such an arbi-
trary and capricious manner could serve none of the purposes of the
criminal law. Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in Furman, stated
that "it would be disingenuous to suggest that today's ruling has
done anything less than overrule McGautha in the guise of an
Eighth Amendment adjudication."5 0
More recently, in Gardner v. Florida5' the Court held unconstitu-
tional the imposition of the death sentence where the trial judge
relied, in part, on a confidential presentence report. Justice Stevens
relied solely on the due process clause to hold that Florida's proce-
dure was subject to the "defects which resulted in the holding of
unconstitutionality in Furman v. Georgia," a purported eighth
amendment decision.5 2
Summary of Judicial Application of Substantive Due Process
Under rubrics of procedural due process, equal protection, right
to privacy and eighth amendment, the Court has been applying
substantive due process analysis in criminal cases. A variety of rea-
sons combine to explain the Court's historical reluctance to confront
the criminal law substantively: the early history of our country in
which economic issues and their relationship to property rights over-
shadowed issues of personal civil rights and liberties; the limited
federal jurisdiction over substantive criminal law; the primary em-
phasis in the Bill of Rights on procedural as opposed to substantive
rights in criminal cases; the lack of jurisdiction in the Supreme
49. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See note 302 infra and accompanying text.
50. 408 U.S. at 400.
51. 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
52. Id. at 361. Several of the concurring Justices would have reached the same result
relying'solely on the eighth amendment.
This conclusion stems solely from the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unu-
sual punishments, on which the Woodson decision expressly rested, and my conclu-
sion is limited, as was Woodson, to cases in which the death penalty is imposed. I
thus see no reason to address in this case the possible application to sentencing
procedures-in death or in other cases-of the Due Process Clause, other than as
the vehicle by which the strictures of the Eighth Amendment are triggered in this
case.
Id. at 364 (White, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun also concurred, citing only earlier eighth
amendment decisions, and the Chief Justice concurred without opinion.
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Court to review even the procedural aspects of state criminal cases
until passage of the fourteenth amendment; the coincidence of the
beginning of Supreme Court review of state criminal cases with the
"demise" of economic substantive due process; the belief that the
definition of criminality and the imposition of the criminal sanction
lay most clearly with the states' police power; and the difficulty of
applying substantive due process of either an ends or means-ends
variety to the substantive criminal law because of the conflicting
purposes ascribed to the application of the criminal sanction. Not-
withstanding its recent forays into reviewing the constitutionality of
substantive criminal laws, the aforementioned factors still combine
to produce trepidation on the part of the Court to admit that its
analysis is akin to, if not indistinguishable from, classic substantive
due process analysis.
Substantive due process analysis has now been applied by the
Court in three lines of cases dealing with the substantive criminal
law. The first two confront the question of constitutional limitations
on the definition of criminality and the third deals with constitu-
tional limitations on the means that may be used to effect the pur-
poses of the criminal law, i.e., the aforementioned death cases. In
the first and oldest line of Supreme Court decisons applying sub-
stantive due process analysis to the criminal law, the Court ad-
dressed the question of whether it is constitutional to impose crimi-
nal liability in the absence of culpability." The second line of cases
concern whether constitutionally mandated criminal procedural
safeguards are applicable in cases involving alternative, and theo-
retically rehabilitative, systems of dealing with social deviants. In
those cases, the Court had to articulate some rationale for differen-
tiating between criminal and non-criminal methods of handling
deviancy. Finally, in the death penalty cases, the Court sought to
discover the state's purposes for imposing criminal punishment.
From there, the Court determined the propriety of those purposes,
the relationship between those purposes and the imposition of the
53. Culpability as used herein is defined more broadly than it is in the MODEL PENAL CODE
(Prop. Official Draft, 1962) [hereinafter cited as MODEL PENAL CODE]. The MODEL PENAL
CODE, § 2.02(2), defines culpability in relation to specific mens rea and lists four culpable
mental states: purposely, knowingly, reckessly, and negligently. Culpability as used herein
further encompasses those who are "morally blameworthy," Hart, supra note 34, at 401, and,
in the words of Professor Fingarette, "response-able." Fingarette, Disabilities of the Mind and
Criminal Responsibility-A Unitary Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 236, 247 (1976). A definition
of culpability which encompasses those who are "morally blameworthy" or "response-able"
includes requirements of a specific rnens rea, a voluntary act, and an absence of justification
or excuse. Although the MODEL PENAL CODE requires these for a finding of criminality, see
note 63 infra, it defines culpability only in relation to specific mens rea.
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death sentence as a criminal sanction, and the necessity for a less
drastic alternative. The remainder of this article will focus on these
three lines of cases.
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS IN TRADITIONAL CRIMINAL
CASES-ENDS ANALYSIS
The Requirement of Culpability
Logic5" as well as constitutional law 5 necessitates a rejection of
the positivist position that a criminal law is any command of a sov-
ereign, and requires instead a determination of the difference be-
tween criminal and non-criminal conduct. Most legal theorists who
have dealt with the problem from Professors Laylin and Tuttle in
19226 to Professor Fingarette in 1975,17 have come to the conclusion
reached by Professor Hart that a crime "is conduct which, if duly
shown to have taken place, will incur a formal and solemn pro-
nouncement of the moral condemnation of the community. '" 5 8 To
evoke this moral condemnation, the conduct must result from an
exercise of free will, since it is illogical and useless to condemn as
moral failure conduct that is inevitable.59 The unique stigmatization
54. Professor Hart rejected the positivist notion that law is a command of a sovereign,
and that "a crime is anything that is called a crime, and a criminal penalty is simply the
penalty provided for doing anything which has been given that name. So vacant a concept is
a betrayal of intellectual bankruptcy." Hart, supra note 34, at 404.
55. See Dubin, supra note 3; Laylin & Tuttle, supra note 1; Packer, Mens Rea and the
Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 107; see also Greenawalt, 'Uncontrollable' Actions and
the Eighth Amendment: Implications of Powell v. Texas, 69 COLUM. L. Rv. 927 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Greenawalt].
56. [Tlhere is an invariable principle to the effect that a mere event is not a crime
on the part of a human being; but crime consists in the opposition of the individual
will to the will of the state, having perceptible causal connection with a given
event. . . . 'Due process of law' guarantees to the individual immunity from pun-
ishment on account of that which is not a crime; i.e., an event not contributed to
by the exercise or non-exercise of his will.
Laylin & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 643-44.
57. Although departing from the traditional common law devices for imposing culpability
requirements in criminal cases, Professor Fingarette states:
A distinctive feature of law is the recognition that in fact some persons, though not
'out of their mind,' will willfully, recklessly or negligently disobey. They may be
evil, or rebellious, or foolish. But they grasp the relevance of law to their conduct,
though they defy or ignore it. They are intended subjects of the law and must fully
answer for their non-conforming conduct. They are response-able, and hence they
are responsible.
Fingarette, supra note 53, at 247.
58. Hart, supra note 34, at 405.
59. Professor Packer has stated, regarding our criminal law system's acceptance of free
will, that
Neither philosophic concepts nor psychological realities are actually at issue in the
criminal law. The idea of free will in relation to conduct is not, in the legal system,
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and involuntary loss of liberty which follow a criminal conviction 0
are based on culpability for having made a wrong moral choice.
The necessity for morally blameworthy conduct is inherent in the
common law definition of crime. At common law, there was no
crime unless there was a voluntary act (actus reus or A.R.), a culpa-
ble mental state (specific mens rea or M.R.), and an absence of
excuse or justification (E or J)." Thus, in traditional common law
terms, criminality can be expressed in the form of an equation: A.R.
+ M.R. = Crime, unless E or J. These elements, whether considered
separately or together, are related to conscious, voluntary wrongdo-
ing, and are, in either the traditional form or a modern equivalent,12
required for a criminal conviction.
The requirements of a voluntary act and specific mens rea are
commonly defined as the basic elements of a crime, with the burden
of proof, both of production and persuasion beyond a reasonable
doubt, on the state. Matters of justification or excuse are usually
defined as affirmative defenses with the burden of proof, of produc-
tion, and often persuasion, on the defendant.63 Affirmative defenses
a statement of fact, but rather a value preference having very little to do with the
metaphysics of determinism and free will. . . .Very simply, the law treats man's
conduct as autonomous and willed, not because it is, but because it is desirable to
proceed as if it were. It is desirable because the capacity of the individual human
being to live his life in reasonable freedom from socially imposed external con-
straints (the only kind with which the law is concerned) would be fatally impaired
unless the law provided a locus poenitentiae, a point of no return beyond which
external constraints may be imposed but before which the individual is free-not
free of whatever compulsions determinists tell us he labors under but free of the
very specific social compulsions of the law.
PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 74-75 (1968).
60. "The combination of stigma and loss of liberty involved in a conditional or absolute
sentence of imprisonment sets that sanction apart from anything else the law imposes. Here
at the very least the line should be drawn. No one should be sentenced to imprisonment or
its equivalent without being afforded the opportunity to litigate the issue of mens rea.
Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 107, 150.
61. A justification, such as self-defense, looks to acts and circumstances surrounding the
event; an excuse, such as insanity, looks to the personal attributes of the actor. See, e.g.,
Fletcher, The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason: A Reply to Mr. Robinson, 23 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. 293, 309-10 (1975).
62. See Fingarette, supra note 53.
63. But see MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.14(10):
'[Miaterial element of an offense,' means an element that does not relate exclu-
sively to the statute of limitations, jurisdiction, venue or to any other matter simi-
larly unconnected with (i) the harm or evil, incident to conduct, sought to be
prevented by the law defining the offense, or (ii) the existence of a justification or
excuse for such conduct.
The comments to this section state:
Here what is needed is a concept that delineates the types of elements to which
requirements of mens rea should be applied. Paragraph (10), defining 'material
element of an offense,' is designed to perform this function. When problems of
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differ as to whether they provide total relief from criminal liability
or whether they merely reduce the degree.6' Such defenses also
differ by either attacking absence of a basic element, such as alibi
(if one is not at the scene of the crime, one cannot have satisfied the
basic elements), or by conceding the basic elements but claiming
that a separate governmental policy (such as the prohibition on
entrapment) precludes liability. 5 This article will focus on the in-
sanity defense, which arguably fulfills all of the above-mentioned
functions: it may preclude a finding of criminality by negativing
specific mens rea or actus reus; it may preclude a finding of crimi-
nality although conceding specific mens rea and actus reus because
of the condition of the actor; or it may merely reduce the degree of
liability in the form of diminished capacity. The factors in the
culpability equation are related and often indistinguishable, and a
finding of criminality is prohibited if any element is absent., Since
culpability are dealt with in the Code, the reference is always to 'material' elements
as distinguished from 'elements.'
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.14 (10), Comment 118 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
Although the MODEL PENAL CODE seems to define culpability narrowly in § 2.02(2), see note
53 supra, it requires for a criminal conviction, among other things, proof of a voluntary act,
§ 2.01, a culpable mental state, § 2.02 (strict liability is limited to violations, § 2.05, and
recklessness is required for a felony-murder conviction, § 210.2(1)(b)), and sanity, § 4.01.
64. [The more common affirmative defenses may be separated into two
groups: those that provide a complete defense by excusing or justifying a defen-
dant's act, such as self-defense, duress, necessity and accident, and those that the
defendant offers to mitigate his conduct and thereby reduce the punishment, such
as intoxication, incomplete self-defense, and the heat of passion or sudden provoca-
tion defense ...
Note, Affirmative Defense and Due Process: The Constitutionality of Placing a Burden of
Persuasion on a Criminal Defendant, 64 GEo. L.J. 871, 886 (1976).
65. Comment, Unburdening the Criminal Defendant: Mullaney v. Wilbur and the Rea-
sonable Doubt Standard, 11 HARv. C.R. - C.L. L. REv. 390, 400-01 (1976). It may be impossi-
ble, however, to separate any excuse or justification from the basic elements of an offense
since all of these factors relate to the actor's culpability under the circumstances. The minor-
ity position in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932), and Sherman v. United States,
356 U.S. 369 (1958), was that entrapment was an issue, much like fourth amendment exclu-
sionary rule issues, totally separate from the issue of the actor's culpability and related only
to misconduct on the part of the police. The majority in each case, however, rejected this
position, apparently viewing entrapment as going to specific mens rea. See LAFAvE & Scorr,
CRIMINAL LAW, § 8, 47-57 (1972).
66. See Comment, Unburdening the Criminal Defendant: Mullaney v. Wilbur and the
Reasonable Doubt Standard, 11 HIAv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 390,401 (1976); see text accompany-
ing notes 116-37 supra.
67. Professor Wales has noted the same assumptions regarding culpability underlie A.R.,
M.R., and insanity.
But what of the underlying assumption of free will? The Model Penal Code and
virtually every code derived from it provide at least two defenses unrelated to mens
rea that may negate the threshold capacity for free choice assumed by the criminal
law. One, the automatism or involuntariness defense, negates a prescribed element
of the crime, the requirement of a voluntary act or omission. The other, the insanity
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each factor relates to the absence of moral blameworthiness, it may
therefore be questioned whether it is proper to place the burden of
persuasion regarding excuse or justification on the defendant.
The application of substantive due process analysis to the crimi-
nal law requires first, an assessment of the proper purpose or pur-
poses of the criminal law, and second, an assessment of whether the
means chosen to implement such purposes bear a constitutionally
permissible relationship thereto. The primary purpose of the crimi-
nal law is the prevention of harmful conduct. This is achieved
through the secondary purposes of retribution, deterrence, rehabili-
tation and isolation. Under an ends type of substantive due process
analysis, the Court determines whether any or all of the purposes
are proper. Under a means-ends analysis, the Court determines
whether a given set of facts justifies a finding of criminality and the
imposition of a criminal sanction in light of the proper purpose or
purposes of the criminal law.
Retribution 8 and deterrence" are both based on culpability-the
defense, assumes a voluntary or conscious act and is directed at substantial impair-
ments to the capacity for free choice arising from mental disorders. Together, the
two defenses suggest a concept of culpability broader than that affected by the
element of mens rea. It is only when the two-step hurdle of minimal capacity for
free choice has been crossed-whether by presumption or by the state's overcoming
defense evidence-that the more refined measures of culpability contained in the
mens rea element are brought into play.
Wales, An Analysis of the Proposal to 'Abolish' the Insanity Defense in S.1: Squeezing a
Lemon, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 687, 691 (1975).
Professor Packer, discussing the interrelationship between the various elements of criminal
offenses, reasoned that if culpability means anything in the criminal laws, "the nonexistence
of excusing conditions must be demonstrated in order to establish guilt." PACKER, THE LIMITS
OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 138 (1972). See also Osenbaugh, The Constitutionality of Affirma-
tive Defenses to Criminal Charges, 29 ARK. L. REv. 429, 432 (1976); Note, Affirmative Defen-
ses and Due Process: The Constitutionality of Placing a Burden of Persuasion on a Criminal
Defendant, 64 GEO. L.J. 871, 872 (1976); Comment, Unburdening the Criminal Defendant:
Mullaney v. Wilbur and the Reasonable Doubt Standard, 11 HARv. C.R. - C.L. L. REv. 390,
391 (1976). See footnotes 138-76 infra and accompanying text.
68. Retribution is a multi-faceted concept and there is continuing debate over its validity
as a proper purpose (end) of the criminal law. The argument, made by Aristotle and continu-
ing to be made by Justice Marshall, is that retribution looks only to the past and serves no
useful future social purpose. Critics further argue that retribution can set the limit on the
amount of punishment that should be imposed, but cannot itself justify the imposition of any
punishment. Proponents of retribution claim that it serves socially useful purposes by rein-
forcing society's basic moral values and preventing individuals from taking the law into their
own hands. See generally Gardner, The Renaissance of Retribution-An Examination of
Doing Justice, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 781.
69. Deterrence is criticized on the ground that there is insufficient evidence to prove that
it works. However, some evidence does exist to show that deterrence works in relation to
calculated monetary offenses of the white collar variety. General deterrence has also been
attacked by Kant, Bentham, Mill and their present day successors in the belief that punish-
ing an individual merely as an object lesson for others accords little or no dignity to the
individual on whom punishment is imposed.
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concept that an individual has the choice of doing good or evil. They
are also similar in that both contain an implied notion of propor-
tionality. The theoretical justification for retribution is that an indi-
vidual who has voluntarily chosen to do evil is blameworthy and
deserving of the imposition of a criminal sanction in proportion to
the amount of harm done. Deterrence embraces a different type of
proportionality. Under specific deterrence, the punishment should
be severe enough to make the individual who chose to commit a
criminal act in the past choose not to commit a similar criminal act
in the future. Under general deterrence, the punishment should be
severe enough to assure that other members of the population do not
choose to commit the prohibited act.
It has been said that "[n]o idea is more pervaded with ambiguity
than the notion of reform or rehabilitation. 70 At its base, rehabilita-
tion encompasses some type of personality change. This change can
be brought about by several means. The least intrusive type of
societal interference with individual autonomy is reasoned argu-
ment that convinces an individual to freely choose to modify behav-
ior. The most intrusive type of interference with individual auton-
omy is socially imposed psychological techniques of behavior modi-
fication." Reasoned argument obviously does not characterize reha-
bilitative efforts in either our criminal law system or our alternative
systems for dealing with social deviance. Thus, rehabilitation is not
based on free will but rather on determinism. Furthermore, it does
not contain any notion of proportionality. Criminal punishment
based on rehabilitative principles accepts certain basic premises:
(1) that individuals' actions are pre-determined by heredity and
environment; (2) that human knowledge has progressed to the point
where we now know what hereditary and environmental factors
shape human behavior; (3) that we can manipulate these factors so
as to cause human behavior to conform to accepted norms; and, (4)
that the state will expend the time, money, and resources needed
to effectuate such changes.72
Isolation, is not really a separate purpose of the criminal law. As
part of retribution or deterrence, isolation has an element of propor-
tionality in it. As part of rehabilitation, there is no limit to the
70. F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 26 (1964).
71. See Gobert, Psychosurgery, Conditioning, and the Prisoner's Right to Refuse
"Rehabilitation," 61 U. VA. L. REv. 155 (1975); Optan, Psychiatric Violence Against Prison-
ers: When Therapy is Punishment, 45 Miss. L.J. 605 (1974); Note, Conditioning and the
Technologies Used to 'Treat'?, 'Rehabilitate'?, 'Demolish'? Prisoners and Mental Patients,
45 S. CAL. L. REv. 616 (1972).
72. See ALLEN, supra note 70, at 26.
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period for which one can be isolated; one is isolated until one is
rehabilitated.
All four purposes seek to prevent socially deviant behavior. The
first two purposes, retribution and deterrence, require that past
deviant acts exist to prove the need for future action. These pur-
poses look to crime detection and punishment in order to prevent
future crime. On the other hand, rehabilitation is based on prevent-
ing future criminality by individuals whose dangerousness may or
may not have been exhibited by specific prior bad acts. The rehabil-
itation process can be triggered by non-criminal acts and even
thoughts interpreted to indicate a future threat to society." There
is no perforce notion of proportionality implicit in the rehabilitative
ideal since one is isolated and rehabilitated until one no longer poses
a threat to society. Although rehabilitation has been viewed for the
greater part of this century as an advanced idea, "the rehabilitative
ideal has often led to increased severity of penal measures.""
The conventional wisdom is that all four purposes underlie the
criminal law and capital punishment, 5 yet there is no consensus as
to which purpose is most proper. It is impossible to have a consistent
theory of criminal law and capital punishment based equally on all
73. The ability to predict future dangerousness is limited. See N. KIrRIE, THE RIGHT TO
BE DIFFERENT 380-82 (1971) [hereinafter cited as KirrIE]; Dershowitz, The Law of Danger-
ousness: Some Fictions About Predictions, 23 J. LEGAL EDUC. 24, 30, 32 (1970); Schreiber,
Intermediate Therapeutic Incarceration of Dangerous Criminals: Perspectives and Problems,
56 VA. L. REV. 602, 618-21 (1970); Wenk, Robison & Smith, Can Violence Be Predicted?, 18
CRIM. & DELINQ. 393, 402 (1972); Wexler & Scoville, Special Project: The Administration of
Psychiatric Justice: Theory and Practice in Arizona, 13 ARIz. L. REV. 1, 99 (1971);
Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1242
n. 217 (1974); Note, Sentencing Under the Proposed California Criminal Code, 19 U.C.L.A.L.
REV. 526, 542 n. 98 (1972).
74. See ALLEN, supra note 70, at 34.
75. Professor Hart views these varied principles as a fact of any penal code rather than a
misfortune:
Examination of the purposes commonly suggested for the criminal law will show
that each of them is complex and that some may be thought of as wholly excluding
the others. Suppose, for example, that the deterrence of offenses is taken to be the
chief end. It will still be necessary to recognize that the rehabilitation of offenders,
the disablement of offenders, the sharpening of the community's sense of right and
wrong, and the satisfaction of the community's sense of just retribution may all
serve this end by contributing to an ultimate reduction in the number of crimes.
Even socialized vengeance may be accorded a marginal role, if it is understood as
the provision of an orderly alternative to mob violence.
Hart, supra note 34, at 401. But Professor Hart recognizes the problem as one of priority and
relationship of purposes as well as one of legitimacy. Id. See also Greenawalt, supra note 55,
at 938-39. Accepting the greatest conflict between a free will deterrence theory and a rehabili-
tative deterministic theory, it is arguable that imposition of a criminal sanction geared to free
will deterrence reasoning will include the environmental pressures existent in a deterministic
world.
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four concepts, since, in theory and in practice, they conflict."6 Ac-
cepting that criminal law is distinct from other methods of dealing
with social deviance in that it is concerned with a conscious, volun-
tary choice to do wrong, primary emphasis in that field should be
placed on retribution and deterrence. The purpose of rehabilitation
should be given primary emphasis in the alternative systems.
Nevertheless, during the course of this century, isolation and re-
habilitation have assumed importance not only in the establish-
ment of alternative systems of dealing with social deviance but in
the criminal law system itself. It is a sign of changing philosophical
orientation or a perceived failure of rehabilitation that today there
is a strong trend toward returning to basic concepts of retribution
and deterrence with their emphasis on free will, voluntary bad acts
and proportionate sentencing. Whether attributable to the basic
fallacy of deterministic philosophy, or our lack of knowledge and
failure to allocate adequate resources, the trend is unmistakable.
This trend can be perceived in the criminal law system in the recom-
mendation of the elimination of parole and probation and in deter-
minate sentencing." It can be seen in alternative systems such as
the juvenile court, in the recommendation of waiver of juvenile
court jurisdiction over older juveniles in favor of the criminal law,
and in the recommendation of determinate penalties78
Confusion in criminal law analysis as to the exact role of moral
blameworthiness arises because of the various concepts under which
culpability has been defined-actus reus, mens rea, and sanity.
This confusion should be alleviated once it becomes clear that all
of these requirements are actually tied to free will. They can be
expressed either separately, as at common law and in the Model
Penal Code,79 or under a unitary theory such as that of Professor
Fingarette. 0
The Supreme Court confronted the question of whether the defi-
nition of criminality includes culpability in three types of cases. One
line of cases deals with the traditional issue of whether strict liabil-
ity criminal offenses, those which eliminate from the definition of
76. An example of this conflict is presented by the case of a young first offender who may
be so affected by prosecution and conviction that specific deterrence, rehabilitation and
isolation do not require incarceration, but goals of retribution and general deterrence do.
Sentencing of white collar criminals raises similar problems. See United States v. Bergman,
416 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
77. See, e.g., IMPRISONMENT, ch. 1139, WEST. COL. LEG. SERVICE, 4752-4849 (West 1976).
78. See, e.g., Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1976, N.Y. Family Court Act § 753-a
(McKinney Supp. 1976-77). See generally Gardner, supra note 68.
79. See notes 53 & 63 supra.
80. See notes 53 & 57 supra.
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the crime the element of specific mens rea, are constitutional. Sec-
ond, the Court held in Robinson v. California,8 ' that a voluntary act,
actus reus, is constitutionally required in the definition of criminal-
ity. Finally, dicta in Supreme Court opinions indicate that the crim-
inal sanction cannot be imposed when the actor was insane at the
time of the relevant act or omission. The Court has, furthermore,
given indications of substantive requirements in the definition of
criminality in its decisions regarding burden of proof, In re
Winship, 8 1 Millaney v. Wilbur, 13 Rivera v. Delaware,4 and Patterson
v. New York. 5
1. Mens Rea
In its broadest sense, mens rea is equated with culpability. Thus,
no factor in the equation can be excluded and only acts and accom-
panying mental states that satisfy all parts of the equation can be
considered criminal s.8 However, mens rea in the sense most litigated
before the Supreme Court is equated with specific mens rea (M.R.
in the equation). The question, therefore, has been whether it can
be eliminated from the definition of criminality to produce what are
known as strict liability or public welfare offenses. 7
The Supreme Court's decisions in these strict liability cases have
been inconsistent. They lead to the conclusion that "mens rea is an
important requirement, but it is not a constitutional requirement,
except sometimes." 8 Until United States v. Balint,8 no strict
81. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
82. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
83. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
84. 429 U.S. 877 (1976).
85. 97 S. Ct. 2319 (1977).
86. Confusion is caused by the broad and undefined use of the term mens rea. Some old
terms, often improperly used and ill-defined, do clarify the difference between mens rea as
applicable to the M.R. section of the equation (A.R. + M.R. = CRIME unless J or E), and
mens rea as regards culpability in the sense that the entire equation is satisfied. General
mens rea usually refers to satisfaction of the entire equation: there is a voluntary act, a
specific culpable mental state, and an absence of excuse or justification. Specific mens rea
means that the M.R. section of the equation has been satisfied by any one of four culpable
mental states: intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently. See notes 53 and 63 supra.
87. Basic offenses dispensing in whole or in part with specific mens rea, such as felony
murder, are often listed with strict liability offenses as legislative attempts to eliminate mens
rea. See, e.g., Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 107, 140-47.
88. Id. at 107. Two lines of Supreme Court cases have given mens rea controlling import-
ance. First, mens rea has been relied upon to save the constitutionality of criminal sanctions
that otherwise would be held void for vagueness. A logical problem with such holdings,
pointed out by the dissent in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 138, 149-57 (1945), is that
imposing a mens rea requirement on the definition of the offense does not make it more
precise. Packer, supra note 87, at 122-23. Second, a mens rea requirement has been imposed
in cases involving problems of free speech and association. Id. at 125.
89. 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
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liability case that reached the Supreme Court had involved the
possibility of imprisonment. Moreover, no decision had dealt with
the issue of a mens rea requirement as a constitutional limit on the
use of the criminal sanction." Balint, however, need not stand as
precedent for the propriety of imposing imprisonment for the viola-
tion of a strict liability offense since there was no mention in the
Court's opinion of the fact that the statute in question included the
possibility of five years imprisonment. In Morissette v. United
States,' the Court held that a federal statute making it a crime to
"knowingly convert" government property was not a regulatory
public welfare offense but rather a statutory formulation of the
traditional common law offense of theft, and therefore required
proof that the defendant knew the property belonged to another.2
The recent decision of United States v. Feola,3 confronted the pro-
priety of a conspiracy conviction to assault a government official
when the assailants did not know that the victim was a federal offi-
cer. The opinion seems at first glance to allow the use of strict liabil-
ity for a serious common law crime. However, the majority opinion
interpreted the federal officer requirement to be merely jurisdic-
tional and not an aggravating factor in the definition of the offense.9
The Court further stated, citing Morissette,5 that if the statute were
in fact an aggravated assault statute, knowledge would be required
for a conviction.
Professor Packer concluded, as had Professors Laylin and Tuttle
before him, that "Strict liability in the criminal law is irrational,
in the substantive due process sense of that word." 0 They would
draw the due process line and require specific mens rea when a
finding would result in criminal stigma and a possible involuntary
90. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 107, 112.
91. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
92. The Government asks us by a feat of construction radically to change the
weights and balances in the scales of justice. The purpose and obvious effect of
doing away with the requirement of a guilty intent is to ease the prosecution's path
to conviction, to strip the defendant of such benefit as he derived at common law
from innocence of evil purpose, and to circumscribe the freedom heretofore allowed
juries. Such a manifest impairment of the immunities of the individual should not
be extended to common-law crimes on judicial initiative.
342 U.S. at 263.
93. 420 U.S. 671 (1975).
94. Id. at 676-77. The validity of this interpretation is questionable since 18 U.S.C. § 113
(assaults within maritime and territorial jurisdiction) provides a maximum three month
sentence for simple assault, while 18 U.S.C. § 111 (assaulting, resisting, or impeding certain
officers or employees) provides a maximum three year sentence for simple assault on a federal
officer.
95. 420 U.S. at 683.
96. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sue. CT. REV. 107, 152; Laylin &
Tuttle, supra note 1, at 636. But see Note, Criminal Liability Without Fault: A Philosophical
Perspective, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1517 (1975).
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loss of liberty. 7 Such a weighing of the severity of result with the
strictness of constitutional requirements is in keeping with tradi-
tional due process analysis." The result reached by Professors
Packer, Laylin, and Tuttle as a matter of constitutional analysis has
also been reached by the American Law Institute in its Model Penal
Code as a matter of policy. Under the Code, there can be no strict
liability where an offense carries the possibility of imprisonment.'!
Despite the failure to rationalize its holdings in strict liability
cases, the Supreme Court will probably not reverse its position that
mens rea is not a constitutional requirement in such cases. However,
decisions in other substantive criminal cases dealing with culpabil-
ity requirements indicate the Court's acceptance of the notion that
a finding of moral culpability is required before the infliction of a
criminal sanction. Strict liability offenses are therefore a limited
exception, which, insofar as the cases indicate, apply only when
imprisonment is not at issue.
Each of the elements necessary to a criminal conviction, i.e., a
voluntary act, specific mens rea, and sanity, is justified on the
ground that punishment in the absence of free choice does not serve
purposes of retribution or deterrence. However, it is difficult to dif-
ferentiate between the absence of a voluntary act, specific mens rea,
and sanity. A set of hypotheticals helps to point out this difficulty.
One lunatic killed because God so instructed. A second lunatic
killed by strangulation meaning only to squeeze a lemon. Except for
the defense of insanity the first lunatic's intent to kill and perform-
ance of the voluntary act of killing would result in a conviction for
murder. The second lunatic did not intend to kill and thus, theoreti-
cally, could not be convicted of murder even in the absence of an
insanity defense.'" Another difficulty in distinguishing specific
mens rea and insanity arises in jurisdictions such as California and
97. Laylin & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 636-37; Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court,
1962 Sup. CT. REV. 107, 150.
98. Just as it has been suggested that civil liability might be justified where punish-
ment might be too drastic as a method of police power, so it may be submitted that
greater public necessity must be shown to justify the punishment of death or that
of imprisonment than might be required to support a slight fine.
Laylin & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 636.
99. See note 63 supra. Strict liability offenses do not really live up to their name. Culpa-
bility is eliminated in such offenses only in the sense of specific mens rea. Requirements of a
voluntary act and sanity are never eliminated. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW, 145-46
(1972) [hereinafter cited as W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr].
100. Actually, the presumption that people intend the natural consequences of their acts
would compel both lunatics to raise the insanity defense. See note 207 infra.
Whether criminality does not exist because of a lack of a voluntary act, specific mens rea,
or sanity, has important procedural and substantive implications. The state normally bears
the burden of production and the burden of proof on voluntary act and specific mens rea. A
large number of states, however, place the burden of production and proof by a preponderance
of insanity on the defendant. F.,rthermore, a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, as
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New York'"' which recognize diminished capacity. In such jurisdic-
tions, the first lunatic might not be totally excused from criminal
liability, but mental impairment would reduce the severity of the
offense and the degree of punishment.
2. Actus Reus
The requirement that there be actus reus or a voluntary act is
deeply embedded in the common law and is reflected in every
Anglo-American penal code. 02 The Supreme Court in Robinson v.
California, 103 made a voluntary act constitutionally required in the
definition of criminality. 4 The Court recently reaffirmed that posi-
tion when it cited Robinson for the proposition that the eighth
amendment "imposes substantive limits on what can be made crim-
inal and punished as such. .... ,10 Because the voluntary act re-
quirement is based on the same rationale as the requirements for
specific and general mens rea-that the criminal law is based on free
will and that neither retribution nor deterrence are proper when free
choice does not exist' 0 -it is difficult to determine the difference
between the lack of a voluntary act, the lack of specific mens rea,
and insanity.
A case involving both lack of specific mens rea and lack of a
voluntary act'017 was Lambert v. California.0 5 There, the Court had
opposed to a simple not guilty if the state fails to prove a voluntary act or specific mens rea
beyond a reasonable doubt, can result in automatic commitment to a mental institution.
101. N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25(1)(a).
102. The voluntary act requirement is clearly stated in the MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.01,
which makes a voluntary act a prerequisite for a criminal conviction and lists acts which are
not voluntary: a) a reflex or convulsion; b) a bodily movement during unconsciousness or
sleep; c) conduct during hypnosis; d) a bodily movement that otherwise is not a product of
the effect or determination of the actor, either conscious or habitual.
103. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
104. Fingarette, Addiction and Criminal Responsibility, 84 YALE L.J. 413, 417-18 (1975);
Greenawalt, supra note 55, at 928-29; Wales, supra note 67, at 704.
105. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977).
106. The MODEL PENAL CODE requires a voluntary act because, "The law cannot hope to
deter involuntary movement or to stimulate action that cannot physically be performed.
." MODEL PENAL CODE § 201, Comment 1 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
107. Instead of saying that "a bodily movement that ... is not a product of the effort to
determination of the actor, either conscious or habitual," is not a voluntary act, MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.01(2)(d), one could as easily say that there is no specific mens rea, or in the words
of the MODEL PENAL CODE, no culpable mental state, accompanying the act.
The textbook case of Kilbridge v. Lake [19621 N.Z.L.R. 590 (1962), provides an example
of the interchangeability of actus reus and specific mens rea. At issue was a strict liability
statute making it an offense to own a car that did not have a valid motor vehicle registration
on its windshield. The Supreme Court of New Zealand, in reversing the conviction, decried
the fact that the emphasis had been placed on mens rea, thus obscuring the "real" issue in
the case-actus reus.
108. 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
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to determine the constitutionality of an obscure strict liability stat-
ute prohibiting the failure to register. °0 The amicus brief in
Lambert argued in clear substantive due process terms that the
registration ordinance was an "unwarranted invasion of the right of
privacy, right to liberty, and privileges and immunities of a citizen
of the United States in that it penalizes a morally innocent and
passive status and is not reasonably restricted to the evil with which
it purports to deal.""' However, the question in Lambert was
phrased somewhat differently by Justice Douglas: "whether a regis-
tration act of this character violates due process where it is applied
to a person who has no actual knowledge of his duty to register, and
where no showing is made of the probability of such knowledge.""'
Several factors influenced the Court in holding the statute unconsti-
tutional: (1) it was a strict liability statute requiring no specific
mens rea; (2) it affected purely passive conduct not normally con-
sidered blameworthy; and, (3) the statute was an obscure municipal
ordinance.'
The last factor makes the decision an exception to the ignorantia
legis neminem excusant doctrine, a doctrine which has been criti-
cized as not in keeping with normal culpability requirements. The
prohibitions against ex post facto laws and vague statutes"3 recog-
109. Omissions, failures to act, are not a normal mode of culpability.
110. The amicus brief [in Lambert] relied on two points. The first point was a
mens rea argument . . . . The second was that the registration ordinance was an
'unwarranted invasion of the right of privacy, right to liberty, and privileges and
immunities of a citizen of the United States in that it penalizes a morally innocent
and passive status and is not reasonably restricted to the evil with which it purports
to deal.' In other words, a substantive due process argument was directed against
the 'reasonableness' of the ordinance, with all of the difficulties that attend such a
position in the climate of constitutional adjudication that has prevailed since the
judicial crisis of the mid-1930's.
Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 107, 129.
111. 355 U.S. at 227.
112. Justice Douglas equated the ordinance to a "law ... written in print too fine to read
or in a language foreign to the community." Id. at 230.
113. On the vagueness doctrine, see generally Note, Vagueness Doctrine in the Federal
Courts, 26 STAN. L. REv. 855 (1974); Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960); cf. Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional Restrictions on
the Punishment of Crimes of Status, Crimes of General Obnoxiousness, Crimes of Displeasing
Police Officers, and the Like, 3 CRIM. L. BuLL. 205 (1967).
There is an aspect of the Court's void-for-vagueness decisions, of which Papachristou v.
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) is typical, that has not often been noted. Although the entire
statute was held void-for-vagueness, some of the prohibited conduct was clear. The true basis
for invalidating the statute may have been that it made criminal innocuous acts that were
not morally blameworthy and should not provide a basis for criminal conviction in our
society.
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nize that one cannot be held criminally liable for violating a law if
the prohibited acts were not criminal at the time they were per-
formed, or if a statute is so vague that it does not give reasonable
notice of what is prohibited. Therefore, the question has been asked
that since "[I]t is inconsistent with basic notions of fairness to
penalize one for an act that, because of the inconsistence, inacces-
sibility, or vagueness of the law, the actor believed legal when done,
why is it fair to punish one who is ignorant of the law for any other
reason?"" 4
The difficulty in distinguishing between the lack of a voluntary
act and insanity is manifested by the words of Justice Frankfurter,
dissenting for himself and Justice Black, in Leland v. Oregon.
Leland tested the constitutionality of placing the burden of proving
insanity beyond a reasonable doubt on the defendant:
[A] muscular contraction resulting in a homicide does not consti-
tute murder. Even though a person be the immediate occasion of
another's death, he is not a deodand to be forfeited like a thing in
the medieval law. Behind the muscular contraction resulting in
another's death, there must be culpability to turn homicide into
murder."5
3. Insanity
Insanity is traditionally considered a defense to be raised after the
basic elements of the crime, actus reus and specific mens rea, have
Vagrancy statutes did aid in crime prevention in that they provided an excuse for the police
to investigate suspicious persons prior to the time when such investigation could have taken
place on a standard of probable cause. At the same time that the Supreme Court was
declaring vagrancy statutes unconstitutional on vagueness grounds, it validated stop and
frisk in the area of criminal procedure. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The two develop-
ments show the interaction between substance and procedure.
114. See, e.g., Cass, Ignorance of the Law: A Maxim Reexamined, 17 WM. & MARY L. REv.
671, 689 (1976).
115. 343 U.S. 790, 802-03 (1952). Justices of the two state supreme courts that have
considered whether the insanity defense can be constitutionally eliminated, have similarly
equated the lack of a voluntary act and insanity. In State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 116,
110 P. 1020, 1024 (1924), the Washington Supreme Court held that to take from the accused
the opportunity to offer evidence that he was insane at the time of the act, would be as grave
a violation of his trial by jury as taking from him the right to present evidence that he did
not physically commit the crime at all. Similarly, the Mississippi Supreme Court in Sinclair
v. State, 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581 (1931), held that a state statute eliminating the insanity
defense was unconstitutional. Justice Griffith, concurring in the per curium opinion, antici-
pated Robinson by considering insanity a disease wherein the volition of the sufferer "has no
responsible part in the existence of the affliction." Id. at 175, 132 So. at 589 (Griffith, J.,
concurring). This is somewhat similar to LaFave and Scott's comparison of insanity with the
state of unconsciousness. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 99, at 271-72. Strasburg and
Sinclair are discussed more fully at notes 122-37 infra and accompanying text.
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been proved by the state beyond a reasonable doubt. Yet insanity
is recognized as a defense for the same reason mens rea and actus
reus are required, because free will, and therefore moral culpability,
do not exist in the case of an insane defendant."' The overlap be-
tween specific mens rea and insanity,"7 and actus reus and insan-
ity,"' has already been discussed. Despite these overlaps, however,
insanity remains a separate concept. The lunatic who killed because
God so instructed may have possessed the specific mens rea re-
quired, intent to kill, and may have committed a voluntary act, the
killing. However, the lunatic could still raise an insanity defense
going to a concept of culpability broader than that recognized by the
basic elements of the offense. The separateness of the insanity de-
fense is further shown by the fact that, in theory, the insanity de-
fense applies even to strict liability offenses, that small category of
cases where no specific mens rea is required in the definition of the
crime."'
The issue of whether the insanity defense can be eliminated has
never been squarely faced by the Supreme Court of the United
States, although there is a dictum that such an attempt would be
unconstitutional.' The issue was raised by the Nixon Administra-
116. Purposes of retribution and deterrence are not served if we convict the insane. W.
LAFAVE & A. Scowr, supra note 99, at 271-72.
117. See notes 100-01 supra and accompanying text.
118. See note 115 supra and accompanying text.
119. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 99, at 270. In practical terms, insanity is virtually
never raised as a defense to a minor criminal charge because of the possibility of long term
involuntary loss of liberty under civil commitment statutes.
Professor Fingarette reviewed the place of specific mens rea, actus reus, and insanity in
the criminal law. His "unitary theory" leaves two issues of culpability to the jury.
The essential D.O.M. [disability of mind] issue, in contrast to the many different
and obscure issues that may currently arise, is the narrow one of whether the
defendant could act rationally at the time with regard to his offending conduct and,
if not, whether he culpably induced the Mental Disability.
Fingarette, supra note 53, at 243.
120. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535-
37 (1968). The editors of the Columbia Law Review have noted:
The excuse of mental disease, at least, as embodied in the M'Naghton Rules, is so
traditional a part of Anglo-American jurisprudence, so deeply rooted in judicial
notions of fairness, that it must be ranked as fundamental. Although there is no
Supreme Court case so holding, it is probable that, at a minimum, this form of the
insanity defense has become incorporated into the guaranty of due process, and
such a conclusion is implicit in Leland v. Oregon.
Note, Criminal Liability Without Fault: A Philosophical Perspective, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1517,
1531 (1975); Platt, The Proposal to Abolish the Federal Insanity Defense: A Critique, 10
CALIF. W. L. REV. 449, 460 (1974).
The Supreme Court has held that it would violate due process for a state to try an incompe-
tent insane defendant. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966). The holding of Pate was
recently reaffirmed in an opinion written by Chief Justice Burger for a unanimous Court in
Drape v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975). The Chief Justice noted the long common law tradi-
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tion's proposal, S.1., which would have eliminated a separate insan-
ity defense but allowed admission of evidence of mental disease or
defect to negate specific mens rea. "I Two state supreme courts
which considered the issue, in Washington 2 and in Mississippi,'23
rejected, on constitutional grounds, legislative attempts to elimi-
nate the insanity defense. These early decisions demonstrate the
operation of substantive due process analysis in deciding a basic
issue of culpability. In both cases, the various justices followed the
now familiar pattern of first determining the purpose or purposes of
the criminal sanction, and then analyzing whether the elimination
of the insanity defense was properly related to those purposes.
In State v. Strasburg, the Washington Supreme Court accepted
the proposition that positivist criminal jurisprudence is inconsistent
with our contitutional scheme of government.'24 Although the opin-
ion is couched in terms of the right to jury trial, the analysis is
unmistakably substantive due process. 2 ' The Washington court
concluded that "the accused has the right to have the jury pass on
every substantive fact going to the question of his guilt or inno-
cence.' 12 To determine whether eliminating insanity from consider-
tion prohibiting the trial of insane incompetents, stating that "the prohibition is fundamental
to our adversary system of justice." Id. at 171-72.
The Court's decision in Drape is a sweeping one. Missouri prohibited the trial of insane
incompetents, but the trial judge found the defendant competent. Missouri's appellate court
sustained the conviction on the grounds that the petitioner had not met the burden of
establishing by a preponderance that the finding was clearly erroneous. Id. at 174. The Chief
Justice, however, went on to review the facts and reverse the conviction as violative of due
process since the record revealed a failure to give proper weight to the evidence of incompet-
ence which came to light during the trial. Id. at 179.
The Court's approach to incompetence to stand trial seems inconsistent with its handling
of the issue of placing the burden of proving the insanity defense by a preponderance of the
evidence on the defendant. See footnotes 177-82 infra and accompanying text.
121. Section 522 is abolitionist in the sense of eliminating a 'separate insanity
defense.' Although evidence of mental disease or defect is admissible if it tends to
negate the mental element (mens rea) of a crime, it does not constitute a general
defense of excuse ...
Two problems are posed. First, one may question whether such alteration of the
insanity defense can co-exist with an otherwise rather traditional structure of crimi-
nal liability and defenses without standing the logic of that structure on its head.
This question poses corollary issues of policy and constitutional interpretation.
Second, one may question whether judicial construction of this decidedly opaque
provision will conform to the expectations of the draftsman.
Wales, supra note 67, at 688-89; see Platt, supra note 120.
122. State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020 (1910).
123. Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581 (1931).
124. 60 Wash. at 112-20, 110 P. at 1021-25.
125. See Wales, supra note 67, at 730 n. 9.
126. 60 Wash. at 114, 110 P. at 1023. Justice Parker rhetorically asked if'the legislature
could exclude from the jury's consideration any fact or facts which it wished and concluded
that it could not.
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ation by the jury deprived the defendant of the right to a jury trial,
the court had to ascertain what basic elements constitute a crime.
The court based its decision primarily on two factors: first, the
common law's acceptance of the insanity defense; and second, the
necessity of culpability in order to prove criminality. In this latter
respect, the court equated an act by an insane person with the lack
of actus reus.'17
In the Mississippi case, Sinclair v. State, the court, in a per
curiam opinion, held that the elimination of the insanity defense
would violate the state's due process clause. The reasoning of the
individual concurring justices presaged to a great degree the ration-
ales expressed by the United States Supreme Court in Griswold v.
Connecticut. Justice Ethridge, in a concurring opinion analogous
to Justice Douglas' in Griswold, argued that the elimination of the
insanity defense was prohibited by a number of state constitutional
sections, including Mississippi's prohibition against cruel or unu-
sual punishments, and clauses guaranteeing due process, equal pro-
tection, and a jury trial. Justice Ethridge focused on culpability,
noting the insanity defense's relationship to free choice concepts
inherent in the requirement of specific and general mens rea'21 and
actus reus. 129 He concluded that the elimination of the insanity de-
fense would not serve the purposes of the criminal law, namely,
specific deterrence, general deterrence or retribution. 130 Justice Grif-
fith, concurring, took a due process natural law approach resem-
bling Justice Harlan's in Griswold. '13 He concluded that an act com-
127. Professor Wales, commenting on Strasburg, noted that the opinion could be read to
suggest that insanity negates all three elements of criminal liability-mens rea, actus reus,
and causation. Wales, supra note 67, at 689.
Laylin and Tuttle equate the right to present an insanity defense with the right to present
an alibi. "[Tihere is no perceptible difference between punishing a man for a criminal act
he did not commit and punishing him for the happening of an event which he did not will
and could not prevent as a criminal act which he did commit." Laylin & Tuttle, supra note
1, at 632.
128. The opinion indicated a particularly sophisticated approach to the difference be-
tween specific mens rea and general mens rea. General culpability is referred to as malice or
animus. 161 Miss. at 159-60, 132 So. at 584 (Ethridge, J., concurring).
129. Some of Justice Ethridge's reasoning foreshadows that of the Supreme Court in
Robinson. See footnote 115 supra.
130. 161 Miss. at 159, 132 So. at 583-84 (Ethridge, J., concurring). Finally, he engaged in
a means-end type of substantive due process analysis by recognizing that part of the legisla-
tive motivation for eliminating the insanity defense was the possibility of perjury. He noted
that the amount of perjury committed in support of self-defense, a defense that could not be
eliminated, equalled, if not exceeded, that committed in support of the insanity defense. 161
Miss. at 166-67, 132 So. at 586 (Ethridge, J., concurring).
131. It is enough that the legislation runs into conflict with the fundamental
and paramount laws of nature. And with that latter as the premise, then there is
no necessity that any particular section of the Constitution shall be advanced into
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mitted without rational will was not an act susceptible of a criminal
sanction and relied on a lack of actus reus, disease rationale which
foreshadowed Robinson v. California. 32
In each case, the state argued that it was appropriate to eliminate
the insanity defense, thus eliminating any culpability requirement,
from the definition of criminality, since the criminal law had ad-
vanced from a retributive stage to one which emphasized rehabilita-
tion. 33 Nevertheless, both courts found that a change in labels could
not change the reality of the punitive aspects of criminal conviction
and punishment.' 4 However, the justices were careful to point out
the feasibility and propriety of dealing with non-culpable but dan-
gerous individuals through civil proceedings and even of involuntar-
ily restraining such individuals for purposes of care and treat-
ment. 135 The same conclusion, that the insanity defense cannot be
eliminated from the criminal law, was reached as a matter of consti-
view. Nevertheless, if there be such a necessity, then it would seem to be clear
enough, upon the premise which we have herein maintained, that the act is in
contravention of. . . the section on due process ...
166 Miss. at 178-79, 132 So. at 590-91 (Griffith, J., concurring). In fact, Justice Griffith voiced
concern similar to Justice Harlen when he criticized the stretching of constitutional sections
to cover every inhibition. Id. at 172, 132 So. at 588 (Griffith, J., concurring).
132. And when an insane person commits a homicide, he does no more than
transmit, as one of the results of his affliction, a death-dealing but nevertheless
irresponsible manifestation of that baneful disorder. It is the disease that has done
it, and diseases which are the sole work of nature cannot be punished as a crime,
no more than could epilepsy or blindness or curvature of the spine by denounced
as penal offenses.
161 Miss. at 176, 132 So. at 590 (Griffith, J., concurring). For a discussion of Robinson, see
footnote 103 supra and accompanying text.
Chief Justice Smith, the lone dissenter, was willing to give great deference to the legislative
judgment that a valid purpose was served through elimination of the insanity defense.
133. 60 Wash. at 120, 110 P. at 1025; 161 Miss. at 180-83, 132 So. at 593-95 (Smith, C.J.,
dissenting).
134. 60 Wash. at 120, 110 P. at 1025; 161 Miss. at 175-76, 132 So. at 589-90. (Griffith, J.,
concurring). This rejection of labels resembles the Supreme Court's approach to the juvenile
court in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See footnotes 257-67 infra and accompanying text.
135. 60 Wash. at 121, 110 P. at 1024; 161 Miss. at 176, 132 So. at 590 (Griffith, J., con-
curring). The same points were made by Laylin and Tuttle:
Care must be taken here to distinguish between 'punishment' as conceived of herein
and other usages to which the state may attempt to submit the individual. ...
The plea of defense is 'not guilty' of the crime charged; and the verdict of 'guilty'
is itself a punishment, as it carries the stigma of condemnation with it. There may
be restraints on individuals and possibly even corporal inflictions which are not
imposed as punishment at all. Detention in hospitals for the insane is referable to
the police power, no doubt; but such confinement is justified by fear of what the
insane person is and may therefore do rather than as a punishment for what he has
done.
Laylin & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 641.
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tutional law by Professors Laylin and Tuttle'36 and as a matter of
rational policy by Professor Hart.'37
Culpability and the Burden of Proof
Due process substantive requirements regarding the definition of
criminality are implicated in the Supreme Court's decisions regard-
ing burden of proof in criminal cases.' 31 It was long accepted at
common law, and finally determined as a matter of due process by
the Supreme Court in In re Winship,'3 that the state must bear a
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime has been
committed. The Court's decision in Winship, however, did not an-
swer the more basic questions of whether certain elements are con-
stitutionally required in the definition of criminality and whether
they must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the state.
The norm in our system of criminal law is that a crime exists if
there is an actus reus and a specific mens rea unless there is an
excuse or justification (A.R. + M.R. = CRIME unless E or J).
Typically, the state bears the burden of proving beyond a reasona-
ble doubt the basic elements of the crime, actus reus and specific
mens rea, on the left side of the equation, and the defendant bears
the burden of production and sometimes the burden of proof by a
preponderance on any excuse or justification, referred to as affirma-
tive defenses, on the right side of the equation. This traditional
formula, however, does not explain what factors may be treated as
affirmative defenses and why. "The mere denomination of a defense
to allocate the burden of proof is a conclusion [and] not a basis for
analysis."'40
136. See Laylin & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 642, 643-45.
137. See Hart, supra note 34, at 405-06, 424.
138. Assuming burden of proof is a procedural issue, it still has important substantive
implications. See generally Cook, 'Substance' and 'Procedure' in the Conflict of Laws, 42
YALE L.J. 333, 343-44 (1933); Morgan, Choice of Law Governing Proof, 58 HARv. L. REv. 153,
180, 191-94 (1944); Sedler, The Erie Outcome Test as a Guide to Substance and Procedure
in the Conflicts of Law, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 813, 855-65 (1962); Tunks, Categorization and
Federalism: 'Substance' and 'Procedure'After Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 34 Nw. U.L. REv.
271, 276, 280 (1939).
139. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
140. Note, Affirmative Defenses and Due Process: The Constitutionality of -Placing a
Burden of Persuasion on a Criminal Defendant, 64 GEO. L.J. 871, 872 (1976). See also Fingar-
ette, supra note 53, at 241:
Under the present practice, the substance of the issue of mental disability, once
properly introduced, becomes linked with a confusing variety of special defenses,
verdicts, and procedures that may, in turn, involve post-verdict dispositional is-
sues, and which can vary from one jurisdiction to another. . . .Each such defense
.. .calls for its own peculiar strategies and legal doctrine. Each could result in
different post-verdict dispositions, ranging from immediate and complete freedom
to lengthy involuntary commitment in either a hospital or a prison.
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Since actus reus, specific mens rea, and insanity all relate to
culpability, and since they are often indistinguishable, the validity
of treating them differently is questionable. The criminal law has
traditionally operated on the assumption that insanity differs from
actus reus and specific mens rea to the point of requiring the defen-
dant to bear the burden of production and even of persuasion on
insanity. However, if insanity is an aspect of actus reus or specific
mens rea, and if actus reus or specific mens rea are not proven
beyond a reasonable doubt by the state, no necessity arises for the
defendant to bear any burden of production. Furthermore, in such
a case, the verdict would be a simple not guilty rather than not
guilty by reason of insanity, a finding that often leads to long term
civil-commitment."4 I Even if insanity differs from actus reus or spe-
cific mens rea, the fact that there is no culpability where there is a
finding of insanity raises the question of whether such significant
procedural differences and substantive results are proper.
Obviously, it is easier for a state to convict if the burden of proof
of innocence is on the defense, but, under Winship, such a rule
would be unconstitutional. Unless there is a constitutional limit on
how a state may define criminality, the difference between guilt and
innocence, a state could achieve such a result by a minimal defini-
tion of the basic elements of an offense. For example, a state could
define murder simply as a killing and causation, placing on the
defendant the burden of disproving specific mens rea, actus reus,
sanity, and other traditional culpability factors. Calling such factors
affirmative defenses and placing the burden of proof on the defen-
dant may be considered a method of forcing the defendant to prove
innocence. 4 2
There may be pragmatic reasons for placing the burden of produc-
tion, and sometimes of persuasion, as to affirmative defenses on the
defendant. An excuse such as insanity is a defense to all crimes,
and, if the state was as a matter of course required to meet both
production and persuasion burdens, the requirement would result in
the expenditure of enormous amounts of time and effort by the state
to disprove an issue that probably does not even exist in the vast
majority of cases. Recognizing this difficulty, Professor Packer'
and the Model Penal Code' would require the defense to meet a
141. See note 119 supra.
142. Cf. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoT, supra note 99, at 152-54. See also note 207 and accompa-
nying text.
143. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CIMINAL SANCTION 138-39 (1968).
144. See note 63 supra.
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burden of production on an affirmative defense, but once a defense
going to a basic issue of culpability has been raised, would place the
burden upon the state to disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt.
However, the Supreme Court has not required a state to prove san-
ity beyond a reasonable doubt,"5 nor has it provided a rationale for
the difference in treatment of issues labeled basic elements of an
offense and those labeled affirmative defenses. The Court has also
failed to adopt a definitive position on which elements of culpability
must exist in the definition of criminality.
The Court's decision in Winship"' is essential to an understand-
ing of the burden of proof problems which have arisen in cases
involving culpability factors. In Winship, both Justice Brennan for
the majority' and Justice Harlan concurring"8 emphasized that the
145. Several commentators interpreted Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), to re-
quire the state to prove affirmative defenses going to culpability beyond a reasonable doubt.
See, e.g., Osenbaugh, The Constitutionality of Affirmative Defenses to Criminal Charges, 29
ARK. L. REv. 429, 432 (1976); Note, Affirmative Defenses and Due Process: The Constitution-
ality of Placing A Burden of Persuasion on a Criminal Defendant, 64 GEo. L.J. 871, 872
(1976); Comment, Unburdening the Criminal Defendant: Mullaney v. Wilbur and the Rea-
sonable Doubt Standard, 11 H~nv. C.R. - C.L. L. REv. 390, 391 (1976). The Court, however,
in Patterson v. New York, 97 S. Ct. 2319 (1977), specifically rejected such a requirement. See
notes 178-218 infra and accompanying text.
146. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). There are two important points to consider when discussing
Winship. First, whether burden of proof is a substantive or procedural issue, the analysis used
by the Supreme Court was basic substantive due proces based solely on the command of the
due process clause. Second, Winship was not a "criminal case," but rather a delinquency
adjudication. The rise of alternative systems of dealing with social deviants-the juvenile
court system is the prime example of such alternative systems-has forced the Supreme Court
to look at the substantive bases of the criminal law system and the alternative systems.
147. 397 U.S. at 363-64.
148. Id. at 372. It is both the stigmatizing effect and possibility of imprisonment that
differentiate criminal punishment from either civil commitment or any other sanction which
society can impose. Two cases, Wisconsin v. Constantino, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), and Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), make clear that stigma alone cannot turn a civil sanction into a
criminal sanction.
The Wisconsin statute at issue in Constantino provided that government officials could
prohibit the sale of liquor to excessive drinkers by a process known as posting. The Chief of
Police of Hartford, Wisconsin, without notice or hearing, posted in all retail liquor stores a
prohibition on sale of liquor to Constantino. The Court stated the issue as "whether the label
or characterization given a person by 'posting,' though a mark of serious illness to some, is
to others such a stigma or badge of disgrace that procedural due process requires notice and
an opportunity to be heard." 400 U.S. at 436. The Court determined that the stigma was such
as to require notice and hearing.
Paul v. Davis involved the actions of two Kentucky police chiefs who, as a part of a
campaign to fight shoplifting, drafted and circulated a poster to 800 merchants in the Louis-
ville metropolitan area. The poster included Davis' photograph and name, and described him
as "known to be active in this criminal field." Davis was previously arrested for shoplifting
but the charge was dropped. The Court denied relief to Davis, and distinguished Constantino:
[Tihe governmental action taken in that case deprived the individual of a right
previously held under state law-the right to purchase or obtain liquor in common
with the rest of the citizenry. . . . The 'stigma' resulting from the defamatory
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interests a defendant has at stake in a criminal trial, involuntary
loss of liberty and the stigmatization of a criminal conviction, re-
quire a higher burden of proof than in a civil case. Justice Brennan
concluded in his opinion for the Court, that "we explicitly hold that
the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction ex-
cept upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary
to constitute the crime with which he is charged."'49
Once Winship established that the state must prove a crime be-
yond a reasonable doubt, the issue of exactly what factors go into
the definition of criminality became important. This, as will be seen
below, reopened the holding of Leland v. Oregon50 regarding the
insanity defense, and led to the decisions in Mullaney v. Wilbur,"
and Patterson v. New York 5' regarding the culpability required for
a conviction for the highest degree of homicide.
1. Leland v. Oregon
Leland raised two issues regarding the insanity defense: first,
whether the irresistible impulse rule was constitutionally required;
and second, whether Oregon could place not only the burden of
production but also the burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable
doubt of insanity on the defendant. Justice Clark, writing for the
Court, sustained the Oregon statute on both points.'53 He, along
character of the posting was doubtless an important factor in evaluating the extent
of harm worked by that act, but we do not think that such defamation, standing
alone, deprived Constantino of any 'liberty' protected by the procedural guarantees
of the 14th Amendment.
424 U.S. at 708-09.
149. 397 U.S. at 364 (emphasis added), In the second part of his opinion, Justice Brennan
confronted the issue of whether proof beyond a reasonable doubt applied in juvenile delin-
quency cases where a child was charged with acts which would constitute a crime if commit-
ted by an adult. In keeping with Gault, Justice Brennan rejected a mere change in labels from
criminal to civil or the parens patriae philosophy of the juvenile court, as justifying a different
result. He emphasized that the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt would not
"risk destruction of the beneficial aspects of the juvenile process," id. at 366, such as confi-
dentiality, informality, flexibility, speed, or rehabilitative dispositions.
150. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
151. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
152. 97 S, Ct. 2319 (1977).
153. As to the issue of irresistible impulse, Justice Clark stated:
Knowledge of right and wrong is the exclusive test of criminal responsibility in the
majority of American jurisdictions. The science of psychiatry has made tremendous
strides since that test was laid down in McNaghten's Case, but the progress of
science has not reached the point where its learning would compel us to require the
states to eliminate the right and wrong test from their criminal law. Moreover,
choice of a test of legal insanity involves not only scientific knowledge but questions
of basic policy as to the extent to which that knowledge should determine criminal
responsibility. This whole problem has evoked wide disagreement among those who
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with the dissent,'54 found that the irresistible impulse test of insan-
ity was not required by the Constitution. Nevertheless, both the
majority and the dissenters seemed to accept, as a minimum consti-
tutional requirement for the insanity defense, the McNaughton
Rule requiring the ability to distinguish between right and wrong.'55
On the burden of proof issue, Justice Clark noted that Oregon was
the only state that required the defendant to establish insanity be-
yond a reasonable doubt, with approximately twenty states requir-
ing the defendant to establish it by a preponderance of the evidence.
As to the two burdens he stated:
While there is an evident distinction between the two rules as
to the quantum of proof required, we see no practical difference of
such magnitude as to be significant in determining the constitu-
tional question we face here. Oregon merely requires a heavier
burden of proof.'55
have studied it. In these circumstances, it is clear that adoption of the irresistible
impulse test is not 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'
343 U.S. at 800-01.
154. At this stage of scientific knowledge it would be indefensible to impose
upon the States, through the due process of law which they must accord before
depriving a person of life or liberty, one test rather than another for determining
criminal culpability, and thereby to displace a State's own choice of such a test,
no matter how backward it may be in light of the best scientific canons. Inevitably,
the legal tests for determining the mental state on which criminal culpability is to
be based are in strong conflict in our forty-eight States.
343 U.S. at 803-04 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 800-01 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter stated:
For some unrecorded reason, Oregon is the only one of the forty-eight States that
has made inroads upon that principle by requiring the accused to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt the absence of one of the essential elements of the commission of
murder, namely, culpability for his muscular contraction. Like every other State,
Oregon presupposes that an insane person cannot be made to pay with his life for
a homicide, though for the public good he may of course be put beyond doing
further harm.
Id. at 804-05 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). By thus acknowledging that every state accepted
the insanity defense and that such is the common law tradition, Justice Frankfurter seems
to indicate that such a defense is required by due process fundamental fairness.
On the other hand, Justice Frankfurter ends his discussion rejecting an irresistible impulse
insanity test with the statement
But when a State has chosen its theory for testing culpability, it is a deprivation
of life without due process to send a man to his doom if he cannot prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the physical events of homicide did not constitute murder
because under the State's theory he was incapable of acting culpably.
Id. at 803-04. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). This statement can be read to support the proposi-
tion that it is within the state's power to define criminality in any way which it pleases, and
that the Constitution only places limitations on the elements which the state has determined
are essential to criminality. Only if the state has imposed a culpability requirement must it
be faced with the burden of proving culpability beyond a reasonable doubt. Such a position
is similar to the one taken by Justice Powell in Patterson v. New York, 97 S. Ct. 2319 (1977).
See notes 213-18 infra and accompanying text.
156. 343 U.S. at 798.
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Hence, Winship, which found a significant difference between proof
by a preponderance and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, seemed
to call this holding of Leland into question.
Justices Frankfurter and Black, with rare unanimity, dissented in
Leland on the constitutionality of putting proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of insanity on the defense. Justice Frankfurter's opinion indi-
cated uncertainty as to the exact position of the insanity defense in
the criminal law. At one point, he indicated that insanity was a part
of actus reus; 5 7 at another, a part of specific mens rea; 5 and finally,
that it was required by a general culpability requirement broader
than either actus reus or specific mens rea. 59 Regardless of whether
insanity was defined as actus reus, specific mens rea or general mens
rea, Justice Frankfurter found that it had to exist in the definition
of criminality or there would be no distinction between criminal and
civil law. His opinion may be read as a rejection of the positivist
view of criminality and an acceptance of the necessity for culpabil-
ity in order to sustain a finding of criminality. Satisfaction of either
the traditional common law equation (A.R. + M.R. = CRIME un-
less E or J) or a modern revision such as Fingarette's "Unitary
Doctrine" would recognize the role of voluntary choice in culpabil-
ity.1o It was unusual for Justice Frankfurter, a judicial conservative
normally very deferential to legislative judgments, to place such
importance on culpability that he was willing to impose through the
157. But a muscular contraction resulting in a homicide does not constitute
murder. Even though a person may be the immediate occasion of another's death,
he is not a deodand to be forfeited like a thing in the medieval law. Behind the
muscular contraction resulting in another's death, there must be culpability to turn
homicide into murder.
Id. at 802-03 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
158. Whatever tentative or intermediate step experience makes permissible for
aiding the State in establishing the ultimate issues in a prosecution for crime, the
State cannot be relieved, on a final show-down, from proving its accusation. To
prove its accusation it must prove each of the items which in combination consti-
tute the offense. And it must make such proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This duty
of the State of establishing every fact of the equation which adds up to a crime,
and of establishing it to the satisfaction of a jury beyond a reasonable doubt is the
decisive difference between criminal culpability and civil liability. The only excep-
tion is that very limited class of cases variously characterized as mala prohibita or
public torts or enforcement of regulatory measures. . . . Murder is not a malum
prohibitum or a public tort or the object of regulatory legislation. To suggest that
the legal oddity by which Oregon imposes upon the accused the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that he had not the mind capable of committing murder
is a mere difference in the measure of proof, is to obliterate the distinction between
civil and criminal law.
Id. at 805-06 (emphasis added).
159. See note 155 supra.
160. See notes 53 and 63 supra.
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due process clause a culpability requirement on the definition of
criminality.'' However, Justice Frankfurter did leave open the issue
of whether it would be proper to place any burden of production or
persuasion of insanity on the defendant.'
2. Mullaney v. Wilbur
Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in Mullaney v. Wilbur'
may be interpreted as placing substantive limitations on the factors
that must go into the definition of criminality. Maine, following the
common law, defined murder as an unlawful killing with malice
aforethought,'64 and manslaughter as a killing without malice afore-
thought and "in the heat of passion on sudden provocation."'' 5 In
a murder prosecution the state did not have to prove malice afore-
thought because it would be implied from the state's proof of an
intentional killing.' 6 Maine recognized that "heat of passion" would
negate malice aforethought and reduce murder to manslaughter. 67
However, it required the defense to prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence that the killing was "in the heat of passion on sudden
provocation." Thus, Maine required malice aforethought as a basic
element of the crime of murder, recognized that "heat of passion"
would negate malice aforethought, and placed the burden of proving
"heat of passion" on the defendant.6 8 The Court decided that
Maine's requirement that the defendant prove by a preponderance
161. Justice Frankfurter explained that he was unwilling to defer to the legislative
judgment in Leland because of a gulf "between deference to local legislation and complete
disregard of the duty of judicial review. 343 U.S. at 807 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
But see note 155 supra.
162. See note 155 supra.
163. 421 U.S. 684 (1975). See generally Trishnet, Constitutional Limitation of Substan-
tive Criminal Law: An Examination of the Meaning of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 55 B.U.L. Rxv.
775 (1976).
164. "Whoever unlawfully kills a human being with malice aforethought, either express
or implied, is guilty of murder and shall be punished by life imprisonment." ME. REv. STAT.
ANN., tit. 17, § 2651 (1964).
165. "Whoever kills a human being in the heat of passion on sudden provocation, without
express or implied malice aforethought . . . shall be . . .imprisoned for . not more than
20 years .. " ME. REv. STAT. ANN., tit. 17, § 2551 (1964).
166. 421 U.S. at 686.
167. The Court in Mullaney accepted that malice aforethought encompassed lack of pro-
vocation. 421 U.S. at 686-87. The majority in Patterson v. New York, 97 S. Ct. 2319 (1977)
clearly stated that this was the law of Maine. Justice Powell, in his Patterson dissent, dis-
putes such a reading of Maine's case law. The only thing that is clear is that it is unclear
whether Maine law included lack of provocation within the term malice aforethought. See,
e.g., Osenbaugh, supra note 145, at 444-45; Note, Affirmative Defenses and Due Process: The
Constitutionality of Placing a Burden of Persuasion on a Criminal Defendant, 64 GEo. L.J.
871, 876-79 (1976).
168. 421 U.S. at 696. The Maine statutory scheme can be schematized in the following
fashion:
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that he acted in the heat of passion in order to disprove malice
aforethought did not comport with Winship's directive that the
prosecution prove every fact necessary to prosecute the crime
charged beyond a reasonable doubt.'
The broadest reading of Mullaney is that the due process clause
places limitations on the state's ability to remove key culpability
factors from the basic elements of the offense by calling them af-
firmative defenses and thereby placing the burden of proof on the
defendant. Stated simply, the state must disprove beyond a reason-
able doubt all affirmative defenses relating to culpability once they
are raised by the defendant. This reading is supported by the
Court's statement that
if Winship were limited to these facts that constitute a crime as
defined by state law, a State could undermine many of the inter-
ests that decision sought to protect without effecting any substan-
tive change in the law. It would only be necessary to redefine the
elements that constitute different crimes, characterizing them as
factors that bear solely on the extent of punishment.'70
A narrower reading of Mullaney would permit the state freedom
to choose which culpability factors it deemed important to the defi-
nition of criminality. However, if such factors made a significant
difference in stigma or punishment, Mullaney would require the
state to prove them beyond a reasonable doubt. The most restrictive
interpretation is that once the state decides to make a culpability
factor a basic element of an offense, i.e., to put it on the left side of
the culpability equation,' it cannot place the burden of disproving
A.R. + M.R. CRIME unless E or J
MURDER
Burden of proof on the state Burden of proof on D
beyond a reasonable doubt by a preponderance
killing + malice aforethought = MURDER unless heat of passion
(if intentional, implied)
MANSLAUGHTER
killing + intentional, but in heat of passion MANSLAUGHTER
169. 421 U.S. at 685.
170. Id. at 698.
171. This is what Maine did in Mullaney by requiring malice aforethought for a conviction
for murder, but allowing it to be implied by proof of intent. See note 167 supra and accompa-
nying text.
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the factor on the defendant.'
The broadest interpretation of Mullaney requires acceptance of
the natural law position that a state must not only include certain
culpability factors in the definition of criminality, but also prove
them beyond a reasonable doubt. Conceding the Court's reluctance
to clash with the states on a matter traditionally considered within
their police power, the definition of criminality, it is unlikely that
the Court will reach such a result except in the most unusual cir-
cumstances. The narrowest interpretation of Mullaney is a compro-
mise between a pure positivist position of allowing a state to define
criminality in any fashion it wishes, and a pure natural law position
of requiring a state to include certain culpability factors in the
equation.' 3 It requires a state to specify its policy judgments regard-
ing culpability and prove beyond a reasonable doubt those facts
which it denominated basic elements of the offense. Unless key
traditional culpability factors are disregarded completely, the Court
would not have to reach the ultimate issue of limitations on the
definition of criminality.
The difficulty in determining Mullaney's holding regarding con-
stitutional limits on the definition of criminality is increased by the
Court's cryptic words about presumptions, which are the opposite
side of the coin of burden of proof.' The opinion stated that it was
constitutionally permissible for a state to require a defendant to
produce some evidence of an affirmative defense and for a state to
aid the prosecution's burden of production by presumptions.'75 How-
ever, the Court did indicate that there are some limitations to plac-
ing a burden of persuasion on a defendant by the use of presump-
tions relating to factors that go to culpability. The Court stated:
Shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant obviously
places an even greater strain upon him since he no longer need only
present some evidence with respect to the fact at issue; he must
affirmatively establish that fact. Accordingly, the Due Process
Clause demands more exacting standards before the state may
require the defendant to bear the ultimate burden of persuasion."
172. "Heat of passion" eliminated malice aforethought. By requiring that the defendant
prove he acted in the "heat of passion" by a preponderance of the evidence, Maine was really
requiring the defendant to disprove the existence of malice aforethought.
173. See note 155 supra for a similarly limiting interpretation of Justice Frankfurter's
opinion in Leland.
174. See Osenbaugh, supra note 145, at 471-74; Note, Affirmative Defenses and Due
Process: The Constitutionality of Placing a Burden of Persuasion on a Criminal Defendant,
64 Gao. L.J. 871, 883-86 (1976); Comment, Unburdening the Criminal Defendant: Mullaney
v. Wilburand the Reasonable Doubt Standard, 11 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rxv. 390, 418-24 (1976).
175. 421 U.S. at 701-02 n. 28.
176. Id. at 703 n. 31.
19771
Loyola University Law Journal
No guidance was given regarding what "exacting standards" were
to be met before the state could place a burden of persuasion regard-
ing anything on the defendant. Further, the Mullaney Court failed
even to indicate whether the burden of persuasion which could be
placed on a defendant must be limited to traditional affirmative
defenses or whether the burden allocated to the defendant could
also include the basic elements of an offense.
3. Rivera v. Delaware and Patterson v. New York
The Court this past term had the opportunity to clarify the sub-
stantive culpability issues left unresolved by Mullaney in Rivera v.
Delaware7 and Patterson v. New York. 78 Rivera addressed the con-
stitutionality of placing the burden of proof of insanity on the defen-
dant by a preponderence. The Court, without opinion and over the
strong dissents of Justices Brennan and Marshall who argued that
Winship and Mullaney called the holding of Leland v. Oregon into
question, dismissed the appeal for want of a substantial federal
question. Unfortunately, even the opinion of the court below (the
Supreme Court of Delaware), shed little light on the position of
affirmative defenses in our substantive criminal law, specifically,
the question of insanity. 79 The Delaware court quoted from Justice
Rehnquist's short concurring opinion in Mullaney that sanity is not
a basic element of a criminal offense and, therefore, it does not
violate due process to place the burden of proving insanity on the
defendant.8 0
Given the importance and difficulty of this issue, the Court erred
in not articulating its rationale in reaching the conclusion that it
does not violate due process to place the burden by a preponderance
on the key culpability issue of insanity on the defendant. This disre-
gard is all the more disconcerting when viewed against the back-
ground of the Court's recent reaffirmance of the related issue that
trying an insane defendant violates due process.'"' Instead, there is
only the Court's subsequent conclusion in Patterson, where it at-
tempted to explain the Rivera decision. The Patterson Court held
that as to matters such as insanity, which a state labels an affirma-
tive defense and does not include in the definition of the offense, it
177. 429 U.S. 877 (1976).
178. 97 S. Ct. 2319 (1977).
179. Rivera v. State, 351 A.2d 561 (Del. Supr. 1976).
180. 351 A.2d at 563, quoting 421 U.S. at 705-06.
181. See note 120 supra and accompanying text.
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is proper to place the burden of proof by a preponderance on the
defendant. 82
The New York statute at issue in Patterson defined murder sim-
ply as an intentional killing. Unlike Maine, New York did not re-
quire malice aforethought as a basic element of the offense. The
New York statute clearly specified that "extreme emotional disturb-
ance" was an affirmative defense' to be proven by the defendant
by a preponderance.' Such a defense, if proven, would reduce mur-
der to manslaughter. In a prosecution for manslaughter, defined as
an intentional killing committed under the influence of extreme
emotional disturbance, the New York manslaughter statute pro-
vided that the state need not prove extreme emotional disturb-
ance.' Thus, "extreme emotional disturbance" in New York, like
"heat of passion" in Maine, was the only distinguishing factor be-
tween murder and manslaughter.
182. 97 S. Ct. at 2324-25.
183. A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when:
1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such
person or of a third person; except that in any prosecution under this subdivision,
it is an affirmative defense that:
(a) the defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional dis-
turbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reason-
ableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the
defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed
them to be. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense
to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the first
degree or any other crime . ..
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1975).
184. "When a defense declared by statute to be an 'affirmative defense' is raised
at a trial, the defendant has the burden of establishing such defense by a preponder-
ance of the evidence." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 25.00(2) (McKinney 1975).
185. A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when:
1. With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes the
death of such person or of a third person; or
2. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such
person or of a third person under circumstances which do not constitute murder
because he acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, as defined
in paragraph (a) of subdivision one of section 125.25. The fact that homicide was
committed under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance constitutes a
mitigating circumstance reducing murder to manslaughter in the first degree and
need not be proved in any prosecution initiated under this subdivision. ...
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20 (McKinney 1975). Thus, unlike the Maine statute in Mullaney, see
note 168 supra, the New York statute required only an intentional killing, not malice afore-
thought which was implied when an intentional killing was proved in Maine, for a conviction
for murder. It purported to make extreme emotional disturbance an affirmative defense on
the right side of the equation totally unrelated to the basic elements of the offense on the
left side of the equation:
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Both Justice White, writing for the majority in Patterson,"'5 and
Justice Powell, author of the Court's opinion in Mullaney and now
writing for the dissenters, 7 recognized that New York's affirmative
defense of "extreme emotional disturbance" was merely a new and
expanded version of the common law "heat of passion" defense at
issue in Mullaney. The New York statute differed in substituting
modern terms for "archaic" common law terms and in permitting a
subjective rather than an objective standard of reasonableness. By
doing so, New York accepted diminished capacity and recognized
that provocation can result from situations other than direct provo-
cation by the victim.
The central focus of the majority opinion was that New York,
unlike Maine, 8" defined murder simply as a death, intent to kill,
and causation. "No further facts are either presumed or inferred in
order to constitute the crime."' 89 Justice White distinguished
Mullaney from Patterson on the ground that New York had proved
beyond a reasonable doubt all that it had to prove under its statute.
Therefore, the New York statute conformed with Winship's require-
ment that the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt "every fact
A.R. + M.R. - CRIME unless E or J
MURDER
Burden of proof on the state Burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt on D by a preponderance
killing + intent to kill MURDER unless extreme emotional
disturbance
MANSLAUGHTER
killing + intent to kill, but MANSLAUGHTER
extreme emotional disturbance
186. Justices Burger, Stewart, Blackmun and Stevens joined in Justice White's opinion.
187. Justices Brennan and Marshall joined in Justice Powell's opinion. Justice Rehnquist
took no part in the consideration of the case.
188. See note 167 supra and accompanying text.
189. 97 S. Ct. at 2325. The majority in Patterson did not seriously consider the presump-
tion problem. It did remark that "[sluch shifting of the burden of persuasion with respect
to a fact which the State deems so important that it must be either proved or presumed is
impermissible under the Due Process Clause." Id. at 2330. Conceivably, the Court thought
that it was eliminating the problem of presumptions by requiring the state to prove, without
the aid of any presumptions, the basic elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt and
by placing the burden of proving affirmative defenses on the defendant. Since burden of proof
and presumptions are merely two sides of the same coin, the underlying difficulties cannot
be so easily resolved.
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necessary to constitute the crime with which [Patterson was]
charged.""'9 Justice White interpreted Winship's requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt to mean only proof of the basic
elements of the offense as defined by state law.''
Justice Powell, in dissent, 'sharply criticized the majority opinion:
The Court manages to run a constitutional boundary line through
the barely visible space that separates Maine's law from New
York's. It does so on the basis of distinctions in language that are
formalistic rather than substantive. . . .The only 'facts' neces-
sary to constitute a crime are said to be those that appear on the
face of the statute as a part of the definition of the crime. "
The distinction between Mullaney and Patterson does not take ade-
quate account of the difficulty of interpreting a law as to its defini-
tion of basic elements and affirmative defenses,' or of the fact that
the Court in Mullaney had stated that Winship was not limited to
a state's definition of the elements of a crime.194 Justice Powell noted
the danger posed by the Court's narrow holding:
The test the Court today establishes allows a legislature to shift,
virtually at will, the burden of persuasion with respect to any
factor in a criminal case, so long as it is careful not to mention the
nonexistence of that factor in the statutory language that defines
the crime. The sole requirement is that any references to the factor
be confined to those sections that provide for an affirmative de-
fense."
One explanation of the result in Patterson is that the members
of the Court did not fully appreciate the substantive dimensions of
their decisions in Winship and Mullaney. Justice White's opinion
in Patterson, however, exhibits extreme consciousness of the fact
that the definition of criminality is a matter within the states' police
power.'96 In spite of the analytical shortcomings evident in
190. Id. at 2324.
191. We therefore will not disturb the balance struck in previous cases holding
that the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable
doubt all of the elements included in the definition of the offense of which the
defendant is charged. Proof of the non-existence of all affirmative defenses has
never been constitutionally required; and we perceive no reason to fashion such a
rule in this case and apply it to the statutory defense at issue here.
Id. at 2327.
192. Id. at 2333.
193. See note 167 supra.
194. 421 U.S. at 699 n. 24, cited at 97 S. Ct. 2319, 2322 n. 6.
195. 97 S. Ct. at 2333-34.
196. "It goes without saying that preventing and dealing with crime is much more the
business of the States than it is of the Federal Government .... and that we should not
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Patterson, the majority continued to recognize that proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is essential in a criminal case in order to protect
the innocent against unjust stigmatization and punishment., 7 In
fact, in Hankerson v. North Carolina,118 decided the same day as
Patterson, Justice White held Mullaney retroactive, despite the ef-
fect of such a holding on the administration of justice, because,
"[tihe reasonable-doubt standard of proof is as 'substantial' a re-
quirement under Mullaney as it was in Winship."99
An inconsistency is evidenced by the Court's continued acknowl-
edgement of the importance of requiring the heaviest burden of
proof to distinguish between the guilty and the innocent and yet
virtually ignoring the very definitions of those terms. The Court
specifically rejected the requirement that a state disprove all defen-
ses going to culpability,'"' even though it recognized that the clear
trend is to have the state bear the burden of proof in such defen-
ses.20' The majority relied on convenience arguments to sustain its
holding regarding affirmative defenses, stating: "To recognize at all
a mitigating circumstance does not require the State to prove its
nonexistence in each case in which the fact is put in issue, if in its
judgment this would be too cumbersome, too expensive, and too
inaccurate. ' ' 2 2 Justice White pointed out the difficulty New York
would face proving the absence of extreme emotional disturbance ,203
a difficulty which would result in fewer convictions. However, this
difficulty was exactly what the decision in Mullaney required of
Maine 20 and what a majority of the states currently require. 20 5
The majority did recognize the need to place some constitutional
limits on the definition of substantive criminal offenses. It noted
that its opinion
lightly construe the Constitution so as to intrude upon the administration of justice by the
individual States." Id. at 2322.
197. Id. at 2326.
198. 97 S. Ct. 2339 (1977).
199. Id. at 2345.
200. "We thus decline to adopt as a constitutional imperative, operative country-wide,
that a State must disprove beyond reasonable doubt every fact constituting any and all
affirmative defenses related to the culpability of an accused." 97 S. Ct. at 2327. The majority
specifically disclaimed any contrary reading of Mullaney. Id. at 2329 n. 15.
201. Id. at 2326 n. 10.
202. Id. at 2326.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 2333 (Powell, J., dissenting).
205. Justice Powell stated of the practice of requiring the state to meet a burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt after the defendant has met a burden of production, "I know of
no indication that this practice has proven a noticeable handicap to effective law enforce-
ment." Id. at 2338.
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may seem to permit state legislatures to reallocate burdens of proof
by labeling as affirmative defenses at least some elements of the
crimes now defined in their statutes. But there are obviously con-
stitutional limits beyond which the States may not go in this re-
gard. '[It] is not within the province of a legislature to declare an
individual guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime.' . . . The
legislature cannot 'validly command that the finding of an indict-
ment or mere proof of the identity of the accused, should create a
presumption of the existence of all the facts essential to guilty.' 201
This statement indicates that the majority would find unconstitu-
tional a statute which simply defined murder as death and causa-
tion and required the defendant to bear the burden of proving ab-
sence of traditional mens rea or actus reus.207 Although it seems that
both the majority and the dissenters would find such a statute un-
constitutional, the majority gave no rationale that would explain
such a result.
There is some indication in the majority's discussion of Rivera
that it would be improper for a state to abandon the traditional
requirement of specific mens rea. In Patterson, Justice White said
of Leland and Rivera:
Under those cases, once the facts constituting a crime are estab-
lished beyond reasonable doubt, based on all the evidence includ-
ing the evidence of the defendant's mental state, the State may
refuse to sustain the affirmative defense of insanity unless demon-
strated by a preponderance of the evidence. 08
206. Id. at 2327.
207. Such a statute would reflect the system of criminal law advocated by LADY WOorrON,
CRIME AND CRIMINAL LAw (1963). For criticism of her system, see, e.g., Kadish, The Decline
of Innocence, 26 CAMa. L.J. 273 (1968).
Justice Powell, in dissent, posed a hypothetical statute:
For example, a state statute could pass muster under the only solid standard that
appears in the Court's opinion if it defined murder as mere physical contact be-
tween the defendant and the victim leading to the victim's death, but then set up
an affirmative defense leaving it to the defendant to prove that he acted without
culpable mens rea. The State, in other words, could be relieved altogether of respon-
sibility for proving anything regarding the defendant's state of mind, provided only
that the fact (sic) of the statute meets the Court's drafting formulas.
97. S. Ct. at 2334 n. 8 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell had no doubts that the majority
would strike such an "egregious" statute, but he could not discern the grounds by looking to
Patterson. Id. at 2335 n. 9 (Powell, J., dissenting). Actually, such a statutory scheme may be
in effect in jurisdictions which use a series of presumptions to aid the state in proving actus
reus, specific mens rea, and insanity. First, regarding actus reus, one's acts are presumed to
be voluntary; second, regarding specific mens rea, one is presumed to intend the natural
consequences of one's acts; and third, regarding insanity, one is presumed to be sane. Thus,
by proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the "act," the state may also prove actus reus, specific
mens rea, and the absence of insanity. As Justice Powell notes, such a scheme would probably
not pass constitutional muster.
208. 97 S. Ct. at 2335.
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This statement may be an indication that insanity not related to
specific mens rea or actus reus need not be proven by the state, but
that insanity which is related must be. Yet that reading may be
invalid given Patterson's holding regarding the defense of "extreme
emotional disturbance," a defense which encompasses diminished
capacity. Since diminished capacity takes account of mental im-
pairments falling short of those which would lead to an acquittal on
the basis of insanity, Patterson may allow shifting the burden of
proof on at least some aspects of specific mens rea.
4. Beyond Patterson
A broad application of Patterson is indicated by the decision in
Hankerson v. North Carolina.09 Although Hankerson involved the
retroactivity of Mullaney, the issue there was not "heat of passion"
but self-defense. The North Carolina statute, like the Maine statute
in Mullaney, adopted part of the common law definition of murder
as an "unlawful" killing. Self-defense would negate "unlawfulness"
and thereby make a killing lawful. The North Carolina Supreme
Court interpreted the general requirement of unlawfulness as in-
cluding disproof by the state of the specific factor of self-defense. 10
However, all killings are lawful if any affirmative defense is estab-
lished. The majority in Hankerson accepted, as it had to, the North
Carolina Supreme Court's interpretation of its statute and, there-
fore, held Mullaney retroactive. However, it left the way open for
the North Carolina Supreme Court to sustain the conviction:
The state does not argue, as an alternate ground in support of the
judgment below, that despite Mullaney v. Wilbur, it is constitu-
tionally permissible for a State to treat self-defense as an affirma-
tive defense that the prosecution need not negative by proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, we do not address that issue
in this case."'
Although the general requirement of "unlawfulness" may be in
the basic definition of the crime, the Court indicated its receptive-
ness to an argument that proof of self-defense, like proof of extreme
emotional disturbance and insanity, may be placed on the defen-
dant. Even in a state using the traditional common law formula, if
the words "heat of passion," self-defense or insanity, or recognized
equivalents, do not specifically appear in the definition of the crime
209. 97 S. Ct. 2339 (1977).
210. Id. at 2343.
211. Id. at 2344 n. 6. Justice Blackmun, in a concurring opinion joined by the Chief
Justice, explicitly agreed. Id. at 2346 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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as basic elements but are encompassed under the broad heading of
"unlawfulness," it may be that the defendant could be made to bear
the burden of proof." '
Justice Powell, dissenting in Patterson, would have held the New
York statute unconstitutional on the basis of Mullaney. His mode
of analysis to determine whether the government must bear the
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt involved a two part test:
The Due Process Clause requires that the prosecutor bear the bur-
den of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt only if the factor at
issue makes a substantial difference in punishment and
stigma. . . .But a substantial difference in punishment alone is
not enough. It also must be shown that in the Anglo-American
legal tradition the factor in question historically has held that level
of importance. If either branch of the test is not met, then the
legislature retains its traditional authority over matters of proof."'
Justice Powell's test, concentrating on substance rather than
form,' sets clearer constitutional limitations on the definition of
criminality than those obliquely referred to by the majority.,' Jus-
tice Powell was nevertheless hesitant to articulate due process sub-
stantive limitations on the states' power to define criminality. At-
tempting to disclaim the substantive aspects of his approach," ' he
would not require the states to include any specific factor in their
criminal statutes. Justice Powell claimed that his approach only
placed "procedural" burden of proof limitations on the states if they
used a factor that made "a substantial difference in punishment
212. In Maine, malice aforethought and absence of heat of passion, were synonymous. See
note 167 supra and accompanying text.
213. Id. at 2319, 2335.
214. Id. at 2336.
215. See note 206 supra and accompanying text.
216. The Court beats its retreat from Winship apparently because of a concern
that otherwise the federal judiciary will intrude too far into substantive choices
concerning the content of a State's criminal law. The concern is legitimate, see
generally Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 533-534 (1968) (plurality opinion); Leland
v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 803 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), but misplaced.
Winship and Mullaney are no more than what they purport to be: decisions ad-
dressing the procedural requirements that States must meet to comply with due
process. They are not outposts for policing the substantive boundaries of the crimi-
nal law.
The Winship/Mullaney test identifies those factors of such importance, histori-
cally, in determining punishment and stigma that the Constitution forbids shifting
to the defendant the burden of persuasion when such a factor is at issue. Winship
and Mullaney specify only the procedure that is required when a State elects to use
such a factor as part of its substantive criminal law. They do not say that the State
must elect to use it.
Id. at 2336.
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and stigma" and that was historically important. Regarding sub-
stantive limitations on what the states must include in the defini-
tion of criminality, he stated, "Perhaps under other principles of
due process jurisprudence, certain factors are so fundamental that
a State could not, as a substantive matter, refrain from recognizing
them so long as it chooses to punish given conduct as a crime. '217
The first part of Justice Powell's test was adopted from Winship.
In that case, whether a factor made a substantial difference in pun-
ishment or stigma seemed to be the only significant element in
determining whether proof beyond a reasonable doubt applied.
However, Justice Powell's addition of a second element, historical
importance, creates an anomaly. If, as he states, "[n]ew ameliora-
tive affirmative defenses, about which the Court expresses concern,
generally remain undisturbed by the holdings in Winship and
Mullaney-and need not be disturbed by a sound holding reversing
Patterson's conviction, 218 a state which chose to use traditional
common law terms would probably be bound by restrictions on
burden of proof. Yet a state which radically altered its definition of
criminality might not be so bound. Furthermore, it is extremely
difficult to determine if an affirmative defense is new and ameliora-
tive, or merely a reformulation of an old common law defense. In
fact, the argument can be made that New York's "extreme emo-
tional disturbance" formulation was a new and ameliorative defense
which did not meet both parts of Justice Powell's test.
Taken together, Rivera and Patterson foreclose the argument that
all culpability factors which the state deems relevant to the defini-
tion of criminality must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. By
careful draftsmanship, a state may place the burden of proving
traditional affirmative defenses and new ameliorative defenses on
the defendant, even where these defenses affect culpability. How-
ever, the Court carefully reserved the question of how far a state
could go in removing traditional basic elements, i.e., specific mens
rea and actus reus, from the definition of criminality and placing
the burden of disproving them on the defendant. The Court also did
not deal with the question of whether a state may dispense com-
pletely with a traditional excuse such as insanity as opposed to
making it an affirmative defense to be proved by the defendant. In
fact, the only certain result of these opinions would seem to be that
future legislators will have to tread carefully when drafting criminal
legislation. They will need to thoroughly consider and clearly pres-
217. Id. at 2337 n. 17.
218. Id. at 2337.
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ent their policy decisions on culpability with a wary eye upon the
fine and confusing lines drawn by Rivera and Patterson.
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS IN CASES CONCERNING
ALTERNATIVE REHABILITATIVE SYSTEMS OF DEALING WITH SOCIAL
DEVIANCE-MEANS-ENDS ANALYSIS
The Theory
The police power is the source of the states' authority to enact
legislation promoting the health, safety, welfare and morals of the
community. The parens patriae power"9 is the source of the states'
responsibility for and control over the health, safety, welfare and
morals of the individual. Theoretically, the state's actions under the
police power are for the good of the communal whole, and the state's
actions under the parens patriae power are for the benefit of the
individual. Since the good of the individual may be said to redound
to the benefit of the community, the parens patriae power may
merely be a subdivision of the police power. Under both, the state
seeks to deal with deviant behavior, and therefore both powers can
be, and are, used for crime prevention. As the Constitution specifi-
cally requires that certain rights, such as those guaranteeing counsel
and the right to jury trial, be available in the criminal justice sys-
tem, the United States Supreme Court recently found it necessary
to examine the underlying purposes (ends) of both the criminal
justice and alternative systems of dealing with social deviance, in
order to determine what procedures (means) are constitutionally
required to fulfill them. It has, therefore, been engaging in classic
means-ends substantive due process analysis.
Three factual assumptions underly "the rehabilitative ideal"
which developed out of the expanded parens patriae power: 20 first,
that human behavior is the product of forces, such as heredity and
environment, which are beyond the control of the individual; sec-
ond, that we can discover exactly what these forces are and control
them in order to mold human behavior; and third, that it is the duty
of the state, for the good of the individual and society, to take charge
219. The origins of the parens patriae power lie in the English Chancery Court's jurisdic-
tion over wards of the King-dependent and neglected children. At common law, the Chan-
cery Court's power never extended to acts of juveniles which would be crimes if committed
by adults. See Nicholas, History, Philosophy, and Procedures of Juvenile Courts, 1 J. FAM.
L. 151 (1961). Today, however, it purportedly provides a theoretical underpinning for new and
alternative systems to the criminal law, such as the juvenile court and civil commitment
systems.
220. The rehabilitative ideal is itself composed of a complex of ideas that defy exact
definition. See ALLEN, supra note 70, at 26. See also PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
SANCTION 12-13, 54-58 (1968).
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of deviant individuals and rehabilitate them." ' These deterministic
assumptions are in direct contrast to the free will assumptions of the
traditional criminal law which function on notions of retribution
and deterrence. The criminal law provides punishment, not treat-
ment, for wrong moral choices 2 2 Each of these assumptions is sub-
ject to challenge, since the theory of determinism has not been
proven. Even if determinism exists, present day knowledge of hered-
ity and environment is still too vague to accurately predict human
behavior. Assuming, arguendo, the validity of the first two assump-
tions, society still has been unwilling to allocate the scarce and
expensive resources necessary to deal with social deviance. 223
Given the assumptions of the rehabilitative ideal, it is not surpris-
ing that the major movement in this country based on the parens
patriae power was the juvenile court movement which began in the
late nineteenth century. Children were the first and prime candi-
dates for the exercise of the state's parens patriae power rather than
its police power due to two factors: the common law recognition of
infants' lack of mens rea, and the belief that children are more
malleable than mature adults. 24 Early intervention, isolation and
rehabilitation were hallmarks of the juvenile court, just as they later
became distinguishing characteristics of alternative rehabilitative
systems dealing with insane, retarded, sexually deviant, and ad-
221. Although Dean Allen described the assumptions of fact underlying the legislation
which established the alternative systems in a section regarding sexual psychopaths, the
assumptions are applicable to any alternative rehabilitative process:
First, they assume a body of knowledge and technique that enables its practitioners
to identify with reasonable accuracy those persons likely to commit dangerous...
acts in the future and to exclude with reasonable certainty those posting no such
danger. . . . Second, these laws assume that there is a therapy adequate to treat
and cure [the person likely to commit dangerous acts]. . . . Third, these statutes
assume, not only that such knowledge and techniques exist, but that, as a practical
matter, they are available to the state in the administration of these laws.
ALLEN, supra note 70, at 14-15.
222. KITmE, supra note 73, at 39, 373. There were limited common law exceptions to the
criminal law's acceptance of free will. For instance, the acts of infants and lunatics were
considered unblameworthy in the traditional sense. Children under the age of seven were not
subject to the criminal sanction on the assumption that they were incapable of forming a
mens rea. Similarly, insane persons were not subject to the criminal sanction. See Popkin
and Lippert, Is there a Constitutional Right to the Insanity Defense in Juvenile Court? 10 J.
F s. L. 421 (1971).
223. ALLEN, supra note 70, at 15.
224. Woman as a class were soon thereafter the focus of the parens patriae power. In the
early twentieth century special statutes were enacted dealing with women accused of deviant
or criminal conduct. The theory was that women, like children, were not fully culpable under
the regular criminal law system, and were more malleable than adult males. Therefore, they
were fit subjects for rehabilitation. In recent years, such statutes have been struck down on
equal protection grounds. See, e.g., Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968);
Commonwealth v. Daniels, 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968).
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dicted individuals.125 In fact, the number of individuals who were
shifted from the jurisdiction of the criminal law to the jurisdiction
of alternative systems increased so rapidly during the twentieth
century that one writer has described the phenomenon as a "process
of divestment" of the criminal law.2
The rehabilitative ideal, once considered an advancement over
the criminal law's emphasis on retribution and deterrence,227 has
come under increasing attack.2 28 Rehabilitation itself is difficult to
define; at its core it contains some notion of personality change. The
change can be brought about by minimal intrusion into the individ-
ual, such as with reasoned argument, or by massive subliminal psy-
chotherapeutic techniques, such as behavior therapy. 29
The violation of a specific criminal statute, an absolute prerequis-
ite to a criminal conviction, is unimportant in the rehabilitative
system. The emphasis there is on the prevention of future harm, not
the detection and punishment of past criminal acts, and on what
an individual is and will become, rather than what an individual has
done in the past.230 But our ability to predict future behavior is
limited and the most revealing evidence about the character of an
individual is often based on past conduct. 3 '
Under the rehabilitative ideal, the individual is, in theory, treated
rather than punished.2 12 In actual practice, the unavailability of
treatment 233 often subjects the individual to isolation and incapa-
225. KrTrRlE, supra note 73, at 33.
226. Id. at 4.
227. Radzinowicz & Turner, A Study on Punishment I: Introductory Essay, 21 CANADIAN
BAR REV. 91 (1943).
228. See Gardner, supra note 68.
229. See for an interesting fictional account, A. BURGESS, A CLOCKWORK ORANGE (1965).
See also note 71 supra.
A simple example demonstrates the greater intrusiveness of a determinist-rehabilitative
approach as opposed to the traditional retributive-deterrent approach. An individual believes
the Vietnam War is immoral and therefore evades the draft law. Under a retributive-deterrent
approach, the punishment would equal the severity of the crime or would be severe enough
to insure no future violation by the individual and others similarly situated. Under a
determinist-rehabilitative approach, the individual would be subject to social control until
admitting the validity of the Vietnam War or, on a more sophisticated level, until admitting
the impropriety of violating the law.
230. Ki'rrRIE, supra note 73, at 7-8, 37; Fletcher, supra note 61, at 301-02.
231. "However advanced our techniques for determining what an individual is, we have
not yet approached the point where we can safely ignore what he has done. What he has done
may often be the most revealing evidence of what he is." AuLN, supra note 70, at 19.
232. KrrrIE, supra note 73, at 40-41.
233. This may stem from the three reasons offered by Dean Allen: one, the determinist
basis of the rehabilitative ideal may be incorrect; two, we may not have the necessary scien-
tific knowledge to know which treatment is proper; and three, we may not have the resources
to implement appropriate treatment. ALLEN, supra note 70, at 13. See also note 221 supra.
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citation. 24 The isolation may extend for a longer period of time
than that which would have followed a criminal conviction because,
under the rehabilitative ideal, there are no notions of proportional-
ity in punishment. 2 5 Determinate sentencing is improper because
the individual must be incarcerated for as long as it takes to change
dangerous propensities. Thus, a minor criminal act, or even a non-
criminal act, can lead to an extended period of isolation. The reha-
bilitative ideal may also result in mere extended incarceration due
to the lack of therapeutic programs, 236
Although the criminal law and the alternative rehabilitative sys-
tems purportedly differ, their operation during the course of this
century has been similar. Both aim at preventing deviant conduct,
and both provide for the isolation of the individual from society.
Social protection has always been inherent in the parens patriae
power; a deviant individual is isolated not only for that individual's
own good but also for the protection of society. 237 Moreover, the
stigma following incarceration as a result of rehabilitative proceed-
ings is often as serious as the stigma which follows a criminal convic-
tion. 23 Today, the alternative rehabilitative systems bear striking
resemblance to the traditional criminal law system: involuntary
incarceration and stigmatization.2 39 Furthermore, the two systems
234. ALLEN, supra note 70, at 33.
235. Id. at 34.
236. A large variety of statutes authorize what is called 'civil' commitment of
persons, but which, except for the reduced protections afforded the parties pro-
ceeded against, are essentially criminal in nature, provide for absolute indetermi-
nate periods of confinement. Experience has demonstrated that, in practice, there
is a strong tendency for the rehabilitative ideal to serve purposes that are essentially
incapacitative rather than therapeutic in character.
Id. at 35.
Yet while the declared purpose of the newly designed programs is radically different
from those of traditional criminal lew, the social sanctions utilized often remain as
severe as those applied by the criminal process. The subject of these proceedings is
not punished or burdened with a criminal record, but he may be incarcerated for a
long and often indeterminate period. In addition, his return to society from a
nonpenal institution is not necessarily any easier, and frequently is less predictable,
than a return from prison. Nor is the treatment accorded in civil or therapeutic
institutions always better or more effective than in prisons.
Kittrie, supra note 73, at 6. See also ALLEN, supra note 70, at 370-71.
237. "In all of its areas the therapeutic state is tinged with a lingering desire to defend
society by isolating and controlling socially dangerous persons." Kittrie, supra note 73, at 42.
238. Note, Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARv.
L. REv. 1190, 1200-01 (1974).
239. Even if the original intention of helping deviant individuals is being realized, one
must also recognize that "when, in an authoritative setting, we attempt to do something for
a [person] because of what he is and needs, we are also doing something to him." ALLEN,
supra note 70, at 18.
Since, in many instances, no treatment is available, people are actually incarcerated
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also share some theoretical justifications. The criminal justice pro-
cess, distinctive because of its retributive and deterrent elements,
includes rehabilitation. Criminal rehabilitation has received in-
creasing attention during the course of this century, resulting in
such changes within the criminal law system as the implementation
of indeterminate sentencing, parole and probation, and in the di-
vestiture of individuals out of the entire process. The alternative
systems, theoretically based on rehabilitation, are increasingly seen
to contain retributive and deterrent elements. Moreover, they result
in stigmatization and involuntary incarceration, the two purport-
edly distinguishing features of criminal law and criminal punish-
ment.240
The criminal law cannot be based solely on retributive-deterrent
purposes: some individualized rehabilitation should exist. By the
same reasoning, the alternative systems cannot be considered solely
rehabilitative: some recognition of the retributive-deterrent effects
of involuntary incarceration and stigmatization is required. Yet,
despite the similarities necessary between the two systems, they are
based on different premises, and different consequences should fol-
low from those premises.2" ' The criminal law's distinguishing feature
is punishment. The stigmatization and involuntary incarceration
peculiar to criminal law follows a finding that an individual is
blameworthy due to an improper exercise of free will. The alterna-
tive systems of dealing with social deviance are based on the indi-
vidual's need for treatment and rehabilitation. Although incapaci-
tation of the individual to protect the public remains a characteris-
tic of the alternative systems, this is only secondary to the basic
principle of reformation."'
If the criminal law is based on purposes of retribution and deterr-
ence, crimes must be defined in terms of culpability: a voluntary act
and specific and general mens rea. Advanced warning of what con-
duct is criminal must be given, and punishment should contain
some notion of proportionality. If the alternative systems of dealing
against their wills for indeterminate periods. Thus, despite benign purposes, mere deprivation
of liberty is undeniably punishment. ALLEN, supra note 70, at 37. Justice Brandeis points out
in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928), that
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the
Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to
repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty
lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without under-
standing.
240. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
241. See ALLEN, supra note 70, at 130; Greenawalt, supra note 55, at 945.
242. See Note, Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87
HARV. L. REv. 1190, 1222-23 (1974).
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with social deviance are based on concepts of rehabilitation and
isolation, the first determination is to ascertain what deviant con-
duct is so hazardous to the individual and society as to justify the
forced imposition of rehabilitative measures and isolation. 4 ' Fur-
thermore, if the primary justification for the invocation of an alter-
native system is the rehabilitation of the deviant individual, a de-
termination must be made whether that individual has a right to
such rehabilitation-a right to treatment. 44
As a result of the vast numbers of people diverted from the crimi-
nal law system to alternative rehabilitative systems, and because of
the increasing awareness of the procedural and substantive deficien-
cies of the alternative systems,15 the Supreme Court in the last
decade has started to examine the underlying foundations of each
process. The Constitution specifically provides for certain proce-
dural rights in the criminal justice system. However, there are no
specific requirements other than the broad dictates of the due pro-
cess clause to provide safeguards in the alternative processes. The
initial cases concerning rehabilitation which came before the Su-
preme Court, involved claims that particular criminal procedural
safeguards were required in rehabilitative settings. In determining
the procedural issues, the Court had developed guidelines to use in
deciding whether a proceeding was criminal or civil. Thus, it had
to consider the substantive differences between the criminal sanc-
tion and alternative methods for dealing with social deviance. 4
243. See KirrrIE, supra note 73, at 47.
244. The outlines may not be clear yet, but a new right has been born under
the therapeutic state. The offender under the criminal law had no positive rights,
merely a guarantee against abuse; a protection against excessive fines and cruel and
unusual punishments. In the therapeutic realm, a new concept of due proces is
growing. This concept is founded upon a concurrency between the exercise of social
power and the assumption of social responsibility. Its implication is that effective
treatment must be the quid pro quo for society's right to exercise its parens patriae
controls. Whether specifically recognized by statutory enactments or generally de-
rived from the constitutional requirements of 'due process', the right to treatment
is here, To some, the formulation of this concept, which curtails the state's thera-
peutic power through legal supervision, may sound like a call for undue judicial and
legal interference with medical and therapeutic prerogatives. To others, this de-
velopment is a mere annunication of this nation's fundamental tool for the promo-
tion of national aims and the protection of individual rights-the system of checks
and balances-is finally reaching into the dark corners of the institutions entrusted
with the thankless role of storing, curing, and rehabilitating those who deviate from
society's norms.
KIrrRIE, supra note 73, at 398-99. See also Note, Developments in the Law-Civil Commit-
ment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HI- v. L. REv. 1190, 1316-17, 1326-27 (1974).
245. Dr. Morton Birnbaum's seminal article, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499
(1960), brought a great deal of attention to the problems of the alternative systems.
246. According to Professor Kittrie,
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The Juvenile Cases
The first cases regarding alternative proceedings, Kent v. United
States47 and In re Gault,248 were juvenile cases. This was only appro-
priate since the juvenile court was the prototype for such systems.
The Court engaged in substantive due process analysis to hold that
the juvenile court had, to a large degree, failed to meet the stated
rehabilitative purposes of its founders. Because a child subject to
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court could suffer grievous injury
similar to that of a criminal defendant (loss of liberty and stigmati-
zation), the Court required a degree of procedural regularity nor-
mally associated with criminal proceedings. Furthermore, the Court
indicated that continued dissatisfaction with the operation of the
juvenile system could result in further safeguards in the future.24
Kent addressed the procedures and standards applicable when
determining whether an individual should be dealt with by a reha-
bilitative system or by the traditional criminal justice system.250
Under the then-existing Washington D.C. statute, Kent, at sixteen
was subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court. This
jurisdiction, however, could be waived if he was charged with an
offense, which if committed by an adult, could be punishable by
death or life imprisonment, and if the judge, after a full investiga-
tion, ordered him tried in the regular criminal court. 5' The juvenile
court judge, without a hearing,2"2 denied motions aimed at proving
that Kent was a fit subject for rehabilitation within the juvenile
court, and ordered him transferred. The Supreme Court, without
reaching the merits of the transfer, reversed. The Court held that
the procedures of the transfer decision were deficient: Kent should
have been granted counsel, access to his social service file, a hearing,
a statement of reasons for the transfer, and appellate review of the
decision . 13 Thus, for the first time, the Court applied certain crimi-
nal procedural rights to an individual involved in an alternative and
The substantive requirement of due process means societal fairness at a given
point in time. It requires a logical and fair connection between the stated purpose
of the law and measures employed for its attainment and it presupposes a valid
governmental interest in prohibiting or regulating the subject matter of the law.
Kittrie, supra note 73, at 317. See also Note, Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment
of the Mentally 11, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1190, 1210 (1974).
247. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
248. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
249. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 556.
250. See notes 289-99 infra and accompanying text.
251. 383 U.S. at 547-48.
252. Id. at 546.
253. Id. at 561-63.
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purportedly rehabilitative system. Furthermore, Kent was invested
with even more rights than those available to adults charged with a
crime.254 The Court also threatened that unless the rehabilitative
purposes of the juvenile court were met in the future, it would re-
quire full criminal procedural safeguards5 ' in the juvenile system. '
In Gault, the Court examined the theoretical bases of the juvenile
court and contrasted it with the reality of such proceedings. 5 1 It
held that the due process clause required that a child receive notice
of the charges, 258 counsel, 259 protection against self-incrimination,2 0
and the rights of confrontation and cross-examination. 261 Justice
Fortas, writing for the majority, 22 noted that the constitutional re-
quirements imposed by the decision would not interfere with the
juvenile court's purported rehabilitative purposes.2 3 He reiterated,
however, Kent's threat that if the juvenile court in the future failed
to provide rehabilitative treatment, full criminal procedural safe-
254. See Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases,
1966 Sup. CT. REV. 167, 182.
255. 383 U.S. at 555-56.
256. Although Kent contained considerable dictum on the substantive and procedural
rights of juveniles, its actual holding remains open to question. The Court at one point
indicated a constitutional basis for its decision: "We believe that this result is required by
the statute read in the context of constitutional principles relating to due process and the
assistance of counsel." 383 U.S. at 557. At another, it indicated both a constitutional and a
statutory basis: "[flt assures procedural regularity sufficient in the particular circumstances
to satisfy the basic requirements of due process and fairness, as well as compliance with the
statutory requirement of a 'full investigation.'" Id. at 553. Finally, the decision can be read
as resting on statutory grounds alone: "The Juvenile Court Act and the decisions of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit provide an adequate basis
for decision of this case, and we go no further." Id. at 556.
257. 387 U.S. at 27-28.
258. Id. at 31-34.
259. Id. at 34-42.
260. Id. at 42-57. The granting of the privilege against self-incrimination may be a very
narrow one given the context of this case. Gault incriminated himself by testifying at the
adjudicatory hearing. In finding such testimony inadmissible, the Court cited Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), which extended the right to counsel and the privilege against
self-incrimination to police custodial interrogation. Since Gault can be read to apply only to
the adjudicatory stage of juvenile proceedings, it is not clear that Miranda applies generally
to juveniles.
261. Id. at 42-57.
262. As with Kent, the scope of Gault is not clear:
We do not in this opinion consider the impact of these constitutional provisions
upon the totality of the relationship between the juvenile and the state. . . . For
example, we are not here concerned with the procedures or constitutional rights
applicable to the pre-judicial stages of the juvenile process, nor do we direct atten-
tion to the post-adjudicative or dispositional processes. ...
Id. at 13. The opinion can be interpreted as applying solely to the adjudicatory stage of a
delinquency proceeding, and, even in such a case, only if the adjudication could result in a
loss of liberty.
263. Id. at 21-22.
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guards might be imposed."4
Justice Harlan expressed even greater deference to legislative
judgment. Rejecting the clear comparison drawn by the majority
between juvenile and criminal cases,2"5 Justice Harlan would use a
broad fundamental fairness approach to determine what procedural
rights should be applicable in juvenile delinquency adjudicatory
proceedings.26 At this early stage of the Court's review of the juve-
nile court system, he would have granted notice, counsel, and a
written record for review.267 This scheme would permit the Court to
measure, case by case, the realities of the juvenile court system
against its theoretical underpinnings. It would also enable the Court
to impose gradual change and constitutionalization if it became
necessary.
In In re Winship26 and McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,2"9 the Court
affirmed its reluctance to eliminate all distinctions between the
juvenile and criminal courts and thereby end the rehabilitative ex-
periment completely. In both cases, the Court employed a balancing
approach under the due process clause to determine whether the
requested procedures were so essential to accurate fact finding as to
overcome any adverse impact they might have on the juvenile
court's rehabilitative scheme. In Winship, Justice Brennan empha-
sized that the stigma of a delinquency finding combined with the
possibility of involuntary incarceration, required that the adjudica-
tion of delinquency be based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 270
He found that the benefits of the criminal evidentiary standard
would not detract from the purported rehabilitative aims of the
juvenile court.21 In McKeiver, the court declined to extend the right
to a jury trial to juveniles, concluding that the jury was not "a
necessary component of accurate factfinding." 27 2 Justice Blackmun
suggested that jury trials in juvenile cases could disturb the
"intimate, informal protective proceeding ' 273 of the juvenile court
by bringing into that system the traditional delay, formality, and
public nature of the adversary system. 274 He concluded:
264. Id. at 22-23 n. 30.
265. Id. at 70-71.
266. Id. at 72.
267. Id.
268. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
269. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
270. 397 U.S. at 365-68. Justice Harlen, in his concurring opinion, emphasized the same
factors. Id. at 373-74 (Harlen, J., concurring).
271. Id. at 365-66.
272. 403 U.S. at 543.
273. Id. at 545.
274. Id. at 550.
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If the formalities of the criminal adjudicative process are to be
superimposed upon the juvenile court system, there is little need
for its separate existence. Perhaps that ultimate disillusionment
will come one day, but for the moment we are disinclined to give
impetus to it.175
Thus, despite many obvious and practical failings of the juvenile
court, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to reject the legislative
judgment that such a rehabilitative system is meritorious and can
be implemented in practice. Instead, the Court required basic pro-
cedural safeguards where their application would not detract from
the juvenile justice system's purportedly rehabilitative purposes.27
The method, the determination of purpose and the requirement that
the means relate to that purpose, is of course, substantive due pro-
cess.
The Civil Commitment Cases
The Supreme Court's two major opinions dealing with civil com-
mitment are Jackson v. Indiana277 and O'Connor v. Donaldson.278
Jackson involved the constitutionality of the pretrial commitment
of a mentally deficient deaf mute on the basis of inability to stand
trial. Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court is pure substantive
due process, evidencing concern first with the purpose or purposes
of the state in authorizing such pre-trial commitments and second,
with whether the procedures surrounding such commitments were
reasonably related to the state's purpose or purposes.
Justice Blackmun did not engage in an intrusive ends type of
substantive due process analysis, which would have required a de-
termination on the validity of any or all of the purported justifica-
tions for civil commitment, i.e., danger to self, danger to others, or
the need for care, treatment and training. This was because Jack-
son's confinement was not justified under any of them.279 He did
275. Id. at 551. Justice White, concurring in McKiever, distinguished the deterministic
principles of the juvenile court with criminal theory that assumes defendants "have a will
and are responsible for their actions." Id. at 551-52 (White, J., concurring).
276. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (double jeopardy clause); Ivan v. New York,
407 U.S. 203 (1972) (proof beyond reasonable doubt held retroactive).
277. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
278. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
279. The Court found that Jackson could not be committed as either mentally ill or feeble-
minded. To support a commitment on the basis of mental illness, the state had to show both
mental illness and a need for care, treatment, training or detention. There was no evidence
that Jackson's deficiency was within the definition of mental illness. The propriety of com-
mitment for treatment or training would be questionable, since the record established that
no training or treatment was available for Jackson's condition at any state institution. Fur-
thermore, the record failed to establish that Jackson was in need of custodial care or deten-
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note, however, that "[Clonsidering the number of persons affected,
it is perhaps remarkable that the substantive constitutional limita-
tions of this power have not been more frequently litigated."25 5 The
focus on purposes in the case, as is typical of many of the latter day
substantive due process opinions, was to determine in due process
and equal protection terms, whether the means used by the state
related permissibly to the state's purposes.
Jackson did not come within the criteria of Indiana's commitment
statutes as either mentally ill or feeble-minded. Nevertheless, he
was permanently institutionalized under conditions similar to those
of individuals committed under stricter substantive and procedural
standards and who would be released under less stringent stan-
dards. ' Justice Blackmun, emphasizing that in such cases due pro-
cess and equal protection analysis mesh," 2 found denials of both
constitutional rights. Applying a substantive due process analysis of
the means-ends variety, Justice Blackmun concluded that the na-
ture and duration of the commitment should at least bear some
reasonable relation to the purpose for which one is committed.21 3
"Furthermore, even if it is determined that the defendant probably
soon would be able to stand trial, his continued commitment must
be justified by progress towards that goal. ,,284
In the second case, Kenneth Donaldson was involuntarily com-
mitted as a mental patient for fifteen years. Although the lower
court wrote a wide-ranging decision based on the right to treat-
ment, 2 85 the Court viewed the case as raising "a single relatively
simple, but nevertheless important question concerning every man's
constitutional right to liberty. ' 281 Since the jury found that Donald-
son was not dangerous to himself or others, the Court did not reach
the issue of whether individuals who are mentally ill and dangerous
can be confined without treatment. The Court did, however, make
findings about the mentally ill person who is in no way dangerous
but who is determined by the state to need care and treatment. In
Donaldson's case, no care and treatment had been provided:
tion. As to the final justification of an independent showing of dangerousness, the Court
concluded that pending criminal charges were insufficient to establish it, and no other evi-
dence was produced. For similar reasons, Jackson could not be committed on the basis of
feeble-mindedness. There was no showing that he was unable to care properly for himself.
406 U.S. at 727-28.
280. Id. at 737.
281. Id. at 730.
282. Id. at 730-31.
283. Id. at 738.
284. Id. (emphasis added).
285. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974).
286. 422 U.S. at 573.
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Given the jury's findings, what was left as justification for keeping
Donaldson in continued confinement? The fact that state law may
have authorized confinement of the harmless mentally ill does not
itself establish a constitutioially adequate purpose for the confine-
ment. . . . Nor is it enough that Donaldson's original confinement
was founded upon a constitutionally adequate basis, if in fact it
was, because even if his involuntary confinement was initially per-
missible, it could not constitutionally continue after that basis no
longer existed. 87
Thus, in Jackson, the Court did not determine whether it is ap-
propriate to exercise power over the mentally ill due to their threat
to themselves or others or because of their need for treatment. Jus-
tice Blackmun did, however, accept substantive due process limita-
tions requiring that articulated purposes exist and that legislative
means bear an appropriate relationship to the stated purposes. In
O'Connor, the Court went beyond a substantive due process means-
ends analysis and found a legislative purpose improper. It found
that the state could not deprive a person of liberty who is harmlessly
mentally ill without providing for care and treatment.
Both the juvenile cases and the civil commitment cases can be
viewed as substantive due process decisions. In each, the Court
examined the purported purposes of the legislature in establishing
the alternative system under consideration and examined its ac-
companying procedures to determine at least the less intrusive ques-
tion of whether the procedures and the purposes were sufficiently
related to satisfy constitutional requirements. In the process of de-
termining this question of the relationship of means to ends, the
Court had begun to develop criteria to be used in testing the appro-
priateness of legislative purposes.
Choosing a System
Given the significant philosophical, procedural, and practical dif-
ferences between criminal proceedings and alternative system pro-
ceedings, one might expect the Supreme Court to establish uniform
standards for deciding into which system the individual should be
placed. Two Supreme Court cases presented issues regarding the
procedures for deciding which system should be used: the previously
discussed Kent v. United States288 and Dorszynski v. United
States.'89 Kent noted the failures of the rehabilitative ideal in the
287. Id. at 574-75.
288. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
289. 418 U.S. 424 (1974).
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juvenile court.9 0 The Court required that significant procedural
safeguards surround the determination whether a child be kept
within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, a rehabilitative alterna-
tive system, or turned over to the traditional criminal justice sys-
tem. In Dorszynski, the Court held that the federal Youth Correc-
tions Act, which permits a federal judge to sentence youthful offend-
ers as adults under regular penal statutes if the court finds that the
youth would not be benefitted by rehabilitative treatment, required
an express finding of no benefit but did not require a statement of
supporting reasons before penal sentencing. 211
Dorszynski challenged the validity of his guilty plea on the ground
that he had not been informed that under the Youth Corrections Act
he could be incarcerated for up to six years for an offense that
normally carried a one year sentence. 2 2 However, after completing
the sentence imposed under regular penal provisions, Dorszynski
found that he still suffered from social disabilities accompanying a
criminal misdemeanor conviction. These disabilities would not have
followed conviction as a youth offender. 23 He was thus caught in an
ironic dilemma: under the rehabilitative scheme he would have re-
ceived benefits such as no formal conviction and no associated civil
disabilities, but he would have been subject to a potentially longer
period of incarceration than under the normal penal statute.
Despite the fact that the judge's choice under the Youth Correc-
tions Act meant the difference between rehabilitative sentencing
and retributive-deterrent sentencing, the Court held that a finding
of 'no-benefit' did not constitute a substantive standard.29 Chief
Justice Burger applied to the Youth Corrections Act a rule generally
applicable to normal penal sentencing statutes. He held that if "a
sentence is within the limitations set forth in the statute under
which it is imposed, appellate review is at an end,"2" and deter-
mined that no reasons had to be given for the choice and no appel-
late review was permissible. The four dissenters, noting the sub-
stantial differences between the two methods of sentencing, would
have required a statement of reasons for the judge's determina-
tion." 6 Dorszynski thus represents a withdrawal from Kent, which
viewed the determination of judicial structure as a major one to be
290. See notes 250-56 supra and accompanying text.
291. 418 U.S. at 425-26.
292. Id. at 427-31 & n. 5.
293. Id. at 429 n. 6.
294. Id. at 441.
295. Id. at 431.
296. Id. at 452-55 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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accompanied by procedural safeguards to ensure the state's sub-
stantive purposes were met in actual practice. Dorszynski there-
fore strayed from the substantive due process approach the Court
theretofore had followed.
The Supreme Court has actively examined systems on the peri-
phery of the criminal process, i.e., systems of parole, probation and
corrections.297 These systems are heavily influenced by rehabilita-
tive theory. The presently conservative bench has hardly expanded
the procedural protections afforded by the Warren Court to criminal
defendants. But given the novelty of judicial review in these cases,
the Court has naturally fallen into a substantive due process ap-
proach. Applying broad due process balancing, the Court has re-
quired hearings, records, findings of fact, reasons and appellate
review.2 18 Such individualizing devices provide a basis for ensuring
that the states' purposes in creating such systems are appropriate,
and that the means used bear a constitutionally sufficient relation-
ship to the purposes of the state.
The Burger Court's approach in parole, probation, and prison
cases contrasts with its handling of sentencing cases. In the latter
cases, it has declined to limit the vast and almost unreviewable
discretion of legislatures, judges and juries. The one break in this
pattern is in the death penalty cases, where the Court recently
297. See generally, S. KRANTZ, THE LAW OF CORRECTIONS AND PRISONERS' RIGHTS (1973);
M. HERMAN & M. HAFT, PRISONERS' RIGHTS HANDBOOK (1973); F. MILLER, R. DAWSON, G. Dix
& R. PARNAS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION AND RELATED PROCESSES (1971); L. ORLAND,
JUSTICE, PUNISHMENT, TREATMENT (1973); R. SINGER & W. STATSKY, RIGHTS OF THE IMPRISONED
(1974).
298. In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the Court considered whether due
process required an opportunity to be heard prior to the revocation of parole. The Court
initially found that the purpose of parole was to help people "reintegrate into society as
constructive individuals as soon as they are able, without being confined for the full term of
the sentence imposed." Id. at 477. Thereafter, the Court determined that the state and the
parolee shared an interest in the parolee's "conditional liberty." After examining the purpose
and balancing the interests, the Court outlined a two-stage process required by due process.
The first stage is in the nature of a preliminary hearing to determine probable cause to believe
that the parolee violated parole conditions. The second stage involves a hearing to decide
whether the parolee did, in fact, violate the parole conditions and if so, the court must find
whether revocation was appropriate. The Court also required notice, written findings of fact,
and review.
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), extended the rights granted to parolees in
Morrissey to probationers, and also considered whether parolees and probationers had a right
to counsel during the revocation process. Regarding the counsel issue, the Court distinguished
Mempa v. Rhey, 389 U.S. 128 (1967), as a sentencing case in which an absolute sixth amend-
ment right to counsel applied. It then held that on the basis of due process fundamental
fairness, a right to counsel might apply in parole/probation revocation cases, but would be
determined on a case-by-case analysis. Consideration must be given to the complexity of the
issues and the abilities of the individual involved, an approach reminiscent of Betts v. Brady,
316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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applied many of the procedural limitations of the parole-probation-
prison cases, such as requirements for records, reasons, and judicial
review, to capital sentencing.2"
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS AND THE DEATH SENTENCE-ENDS
AND MEANS-ENDS ANALYSIS
Because statutory formulations of the purposes of criminal law
are generally both broad and vague, and because appellate review
of sentencing has not been the norm, the courts have had little
opportunity to determine whether the imposition of a criminal sanc-
tion squares with any or all of the possible purposes for imposing the
criminal sanction-retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and iso-
lation. In Furman v. Georgia,3°" however, every Justice of the Su-
preme Court analyzed the death penalty in terms of whether it
satisfied any of the purported purposes of the criminal sanction .30
The death penalty decisions are classic examples of substantive
due process analysis. The decisions scrutinize first, the purposes
of the criminal sanction, second, whether the means (the death
penalty), bear a constitutionally acceptable relationship to the pur-
poses, and third, whether a less severe alternative is possible and
constitutionally necessary. Less drastic alternatives to the general
imposition of the death sentence could be either life imprisonment
or the selective imposition of death only in cases where it would
most effectively fulfill the purposes of punishment.
The statutes challenged in Furman imposed the death sentence
without standards and without appellate review. Five Justices con-
curred to find the death penalties unconstitutional, and each had
different views about the propriety of the purported legislative pur-
poses in enacting criminal statutes. Nevertheless, all agreed that
under the statutes before them in Furman the death sentence could
be so seldom imposed or imposed in such an arbitrary and capri-
cious manner that it would serve none of the purposes of the crimi-
nal law. 01 They therefore declared the statutes unconstitutional.
Four years later, the Supreme Court upheld discretionary death
sentence statutes in Gregg v. Georgia,130 Proffitt v. Florida,4 and
299. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
300. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
301. Id. at 239-40. Each Justice wrote a separate opinion. Justices Douglas, Brennan,
Stewart, White and Marshall concurred, and Justices Burger, Blackmun, Powell and
Rehnquist dissented.
302. See Wheeler, Towards a Theory of Limited Punishment II: The Eighth Amendment
after Furman v. Georgia, 25 STAN. L. REv. 62, 71 (1972).
303. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
304. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
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Jurek v. Texas,35 and declared unconstitutional mandatory death
sentence statutes in Woodson ii. North Carolina"6 and Roberts v.
Louisiana.30 7 Justices Brennan and Marshall voted against the
death sentence in Furman and in all the 1976 cases. Justices Burger,
Blackmun and Rehnquist dissented in Furman and voted to uphold
the death sentence in all the 1976 cases. Justice White voted against
the death sentence in Furman, but voted to uphold it in all the 1976
cases. The key opinions in the 1976 cases were the plurality opinions
of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, in which these three
''swing" Justices upheld the imposition of the death sentence in the
discretionary cases and found it unconstitutional in the mandatory
cases. 308
Although Furman and the 1976 cases were purportedly eighth
amendment 'cruel and unusual punishment' decisions, the actual
mode of analysis was substantive due process. The nexus between
eighth amendment and due process analysis has previously been
noted 39 and is clear when the 1976 death penalty cases are consid-
ered in light of the Court's 1971 holding in McGautha v.
California. 3, In McGautha the Court held that due process required
neither standards for the imposition of the death sentence nor bifur-
cated trials in capital cases .31 In 1976 the Court upheld the imposi-
305. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
306. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
307. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
308. In Gregg, the discretionary case, the judgment of the court was announced in an
opinion by Justices Stewart, Powell and Stevens. Justice Burger wrote a concurring statement
which Justice Rehnquist joined. Justice White wrote a concurring opinion which Justices
Burger and Rehnquist joined. Justice Blackmun wrote a separate concurring statement.
Justices Brennan and Marshall wrote dissenting opinions. In Woodson, the mandatory case,
the judgment of the Court was announced in an opinion by Justices Stewart, Powell and
Stevens. Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion which Justices Burger and Rehnquist
joined. Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting statement and Justice Rehnquist filed a dissent-
ing opinion. Thus, the discretionary cases were decided 7-2 and the mandatory cases were
decided 5-4.
309. See notes 48-53 supra and accompanying text. In Furman, Justice Powell commented
on the close proximity between the eighth amendment and due process clause in the area of
capital punishment:
Whether one views the question as one of due process or cruel and unusual punish-
ment, as I do for convenience in this case, the issue is essentially the same. The
fundamental premise upon which either standard is based is that notions of what
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment or due process do evolve.
428 U.S. at 429.
310. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
311. Id. at 208, 221. Justice Burger believed that Furman overruled McGautha. Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 400 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). A majority of the Court, however, did
not adopt this view. The Gregg plurality distinguished McGautha on the grounds that it was
a due process decision and that Furman was based on the eighth amendment. Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. at 195 n. 47. Given the similarity between due process and eighth amend-
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tion of death under the rubric of the eighth amendment only in
those cases where the sentence was imposed under statutes which
required standards, bifurcated trials, and appellate review. The re-
cent decision of Gardner v. Florida, that the due process clause
would be violated by the imposition of the death sentence in a case
where the trial judge had relied, in part, on a confidential pre-
sentence report, further establishes the nexus.312
Gregg v. Georgia was the focal point of the 1976 death penalty
cases. The plurality upheld limited discretionary application of the
death sentence, warning, however, that neither total discretion nor
total lack of discretion (mandatory death) satisfies constitutional
requirements. Furman had already outlawed complete discretionary
application of the death sentence on the ground that it resulted in
arbitrary and capricious imposition of death, a result which could
not fulfill any of the purposes of the criminal sanction. 33 The plural-
ity found that mandatory imposition of the death sentence for a
variety of murders, however, does not result in consistent and ra-
tional fulfillment of the criminal sanction either."4 Although such
reasoning applies to sentencing generally, the plurality limited it to
the imposition of the death sentence because death is obviously
irreversible and "different," thus requiring a degree of rationality
that is not constitutionally necessary in the imposition of other
sentences .31
The plurality established a general test for the constitutionality
of a criminal penalty .31 The two major guidelines are the avoidance
ment analysis in death cases, the attempt fails. More realistic is the plurality's acknowledge-
ment that McGautha's assumption that it was impossible to devise standards and regularize
jury sentencing did not withstand the test of time. Id. By means of bifurcated trials, stan-
dards, and appellate review, the states managed to establish systems of insuring that the
death sentence would not be applied in an arbitrary and capricious fashion. Although bifur-
cated trial procedures existed in each of the three state schemes upheld by the Court in 1976,
the plurality carefully avoided saying that any one element of these schemes, even bifurcated
trial, was constitutionally required.
312. 97 S. Ct. 1197 (1977).
313. The Gregg plurality interpreted Furman as mandating that when discretion is given
a sentencing body to decide a matter as grave as the death penalty, that discretion must be
limited and directed "so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action."
428 U.S. at 189.
314. See notes 327-36 infra and accompanying text.
315. 428 U.S. at 188-95. In his plurality opinion in Gardner v. Florida, 97 S. Ct. 1197, 1206
(1977), Justice Stewart stated the obvious in explaining why death is "different": "IThe
extinction of all possibility of rehabilitation is one of the aspects of the death sentence that
makes it different in kind from any other sentence a state may legitimately impose."
316. The Court stated that the punishment must not be excessive. The determination of
excessiveness had two aspects: (1) the punishment must not involve an unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain; and (2) the punishment must not be out of proportion with the
severity of the crime. 428 U.S. at 173.
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of "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain"3 '7 (the Furman stan-
dard), and proportionality. The problem of proportionality, how-
ever, did not exist in the cases before the Court as they involved only
the crime of murder."8 The state statutes passing Constitutional
muster shared three major characteristics: bifurcated trial, sentenc-
ing standards, and appellate review of the death sentence in individ-
ual cases." ' These factors, individually and in combination, helped
to eliminate the Furman problem of arbitrary and capricious sent-
encing. Their effect was to focus attention on appropriate sentenc-
ing considerations at the time of disposition and to provide a review
system to ensure uniform application of the appropriate considera-
tions. Although the plurality did not, as a matter of constitutional
law, require any or all of the factors,2 0 it did approve the presence
of each factor in each case.32" '
Woodson v. North Carolina322 and Roberts v. Louisiana23 pre-
sented mandatory death statutes to the court. The North Carolina
statute made death mandatory for all first degree murder convic-
tions, defining murder in traditional common law terms to include
premeditated killings and felony-murders. 24 The Louisiana statute
imposed mandatory death for a more narrowly defined crime of first
degree murder.25 It provided for four possible verdicts (guilty, guilty
of second degree murder, guilty of manslaughter, and not guilty)
and required that the jury be instructed on all verdicts, whether or
not supported by evidence or requested by the defendant.2 1
The plurality did not attempt to determine if the aims of the
criminal sanction were proper but analyzed only whether the proce-
dures employed to fulfill them were appropriate. Stated in sub-
stantive due process terms, the court did not engage in an intrusive
317. Id.
318. Id. at 187.
319. 428 U.S. at 162-68; 428 U.S. at 427-53; 428 U.S. at 268-74.
320. 428 U.S. at 195.
321. Id. at 195, 206-07.
322. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
323. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
324. The plurality emphasized that the North Carolina statute in Woodson was basically
the same one the North Carolina Supreme Court held in violation of Furman. The North
Carolina legislature redrafted the old statute but included a mandatory death sentence. -428
U.S. at 285-86.
325. 428 U.S. at 328-31 & n. 3.
326. Id. at 330.
327. The plurality claimed to approach the issue procedurally rather than substantively:
[T]he Court now addresses for the first time the question whether a death sentence
returned pursuant to a law imposing a mandatory death penalty for a broad cate-
gory of homicidal offenses constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the
meaning of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The issue, like that explored
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ends approach, but rather in a less intrusive means-ends analysis.
However, the means-ends analysis employed was rather vigorous,
and included the notion of least restrictive alternatives in the re-
quirement of individualization.32 8
The plurality found mandatory death sentences unconstitutional
for three reasons. First, the "two crucial indicators of evolving stan-
dards of decency respecting the imposition of punishment in our
society-jury determinations and legislative enactments," both
pointed conclusively to the repudiation of automatic capital sent-
ences. 3 9 Second, a mandatory death statute did not fulfill Furman's
requirement that wanton jury discretion be replaced by a rationally
reviewable process. 3 0 Finally, the peculiarity of death as a sentence
required the consideration of each person individually. 33'
The first point is a traditional 'evolving standards of decency'
position. The second and third points must be read together.
Furman banned arbitrary and capricious application of the death
sentence on the ground that it could not serve the purposes of the
criminal law. Thus, for the death sentence to be constitutional, it
must be applied in a rational and consistent fashion. A majority of
the Court, consisting of the plurality plus the dissenting Justices,
believed that the mandatory imposition of the death sentence is
rational and serves purposes of deterrence. The plurality, however,
required the less severe alternative of individualized consideration
of whether the death sentence in a particular case fulfills purposes
of retribution, deterrence and isolation.
The high degree of individualization required by the 1976 manda-
tory death cases was underscored by the Court's later decision in
Harry Roberts v. Louisiana.312 Five members of the Court joined in
a per curiam opinion finding unconstitutional a section of the Louis-
iana murder statute making death mandatory for intentionally kill-
ing a police officer in the line of duty. Although recognizing that
such a killing could be regarded as taking place under aggravating
circumstances, and that society has a special interest in protecting
the police, 331 the Court found it was "incorrect to suppose that no
in Furman, involves the procedure employed by the State to select persons for the
unique and irreversible penalty of death.
Id. at 287.
328. See note 17 supra.
329. 428 U.S. at 292-93.
330. Id. at 303.
331. Id. at 303-04.
332. 97 S. Ct. 1993.
333. Id. at 1995.
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mitigating circumstances can exist when the victim is a police offi-
cer. 3 34 The majority stated:
As we emphasized repeatedly in Roberts and its companion
cases decided last Term, it is essential that the capital sentencing
decision allow for consideration of whatever mitigating circum-
stances may be relevant to either the particular offender or the
particular offense. Because the Louisiana statute does not allow
consideration of particularized mitigating factors, it is unconstitu-
tional.135
Thus, not only must a statutory scheme provide for individualizing
procedural devices, but mitigating and aggravating factors must be
taken into consideration as well. 36
The death penalty opinions all utilize substantive due process
analysis by focusing on the propriety of retribution, deterrence, iso-
lation and rehabilitation as legislative ends. The opinions further
address the relationship between legislative means and ends, and
whether the death sentence can be imposed as a mandatory penalty
or whether it can be applied only in individual cases. Examination
of these opinions reveals a disparity among the individual Justices
as to their willingness to defer to legislative judgments. This defer-
ence is important to examining the propriety of the criminal sanc-
tion, and finally, to determining the weight to be given legislative
responses to Furman. It establishes the degree of relationship neces-
sary for a means-ends analysis, including whether the general man-
datory imposition of the death sentence fulfills legislative purposes
and whether the Constitution requires a less drastic alternative.
Along with judicial deference, burden of proof figures significantly
in the various opinions. The positions of the Justices on the deter-
rent effect of the death sentence depended on their willingness to
place the burden of proof on the legislatures or upon those attack-
ing the legislative judgments. If the evidence is inconclusive as to
whether the death penalty is a better general deterrent than life
334. Id. at 1996:
Circumstances such as the youth of the offender, the absence of any prior convic-
tion, the influence of drugs, alcohol or extreme emotional disturbance, and even the
existence of circumstances which the offender reasonably believed provided a moral
justification for his conduct are all examples of mitigating facts which might attend
the killing of a peace officer and which are considered relevant in other jurisdic-
tions.
335. Id.
336. The Court did reserve "the question whether or in what circumstances mandatory
death sentence statutes may be constitutionally applied to prisoners serving life sentences."
Id. at 1996 n. 5.
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imprisonment, the side with the burden of proof will lose."'
All of the 1976 opinions interpreted Furman as holding that the
death sentences in those cases were unconstitutional because death
was applied in an arbitrary and capricious fashion which failed to
fulfill any of the purposes of the criminal law. The three member
plurality upheld discretionary systems when they contained bifur-
cated trial, standards, and appellate review, and struck down man-
datory death penalties for a failure to individualize. Yet they did not
reject any of the purported purposes of the criminal sanction. The
plurality Justices, along with Justices Burger, White, Blackmun,
and Rehnquist who voted to sustain the death sentence in all the
1976 cases, deferred to legislative judgment in determining the pro-
priety of various purposes of the criminal law, particularly with
relation to retribution and deterrence. The plurality regarded retri-
bution as a proper purpose of criminal laws33 and deemed the death
sentence an appropriate penalty in murder cases on a proportional-
ity theory, e.g., a life for a life.339 The plurality further accepted the
legislative judgment that the death sentence does deter, and conse-
quently placed the burden of proving non-deterrence on those chal-
lenging the statutes.30 Thus, neither the plurality Justices nor Jus-
tices Burger, White, Blackmun or Rehnquist, engaged in the most
intrusive ends type of substantive due process analysis to find any
purpose of the criminal sanction improper.
Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall did not extend the same
deference to legislative judgment that was expressed by the other
members of the Court. Justice Brennan never mentioned the degree
337. Wheeler, Toward a Theory of a Limited Punishment II: The Eighth Amendment
after Furman v. Georgia, 25 STAN. L. REv. 62, 78 (1972).
338. In part, capital punishment is an expression of society's moral outrage at
particularly offensive conduct. This function may be unappealing to many, but it
is essential in an ordered society that asks its citizens to rely on legal processes
rather than self-help to vindicate their wrongs .... "Retribution is no longer the
dominant objective of the criminal law", Williams v. New York .... but neither
is it a forbidden objective or one inconsistent with our respect for the dignity of
men. . . . Indeed, the decision that capital punishment may be the appropriate
sanction in extreme cases is an expression of the community's belief that certain
crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate
response may be the penalty of death.
428 U.S. at 183-84.
339. Id. at 187. The plurality reserved judgment on the constitutionality of the death
penalty for any crime other than murder. Id. at 187 n. 35. However, in Coker v. Georgia, 97
S. Ct. 2861 (1977), Justice White, in an opinion joined by Justices Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, relied on a proportionality theory to hold that the death sentence was excessive
punishment under the eighth amendment for the crime of rape. Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall concurred on the grounds that the death penalty is unconstitutional in all cases. Only
Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger dissented.
340. Id. at 186.
19771
Loyola University Law Journal
of deference to be given to legislative judgment .3 1 Justice Marshall
expressed a type of natural law "right reason" requirement. He
would not defer to the legislative or even public judgments unless
they were "informed." '342 Both Brennan and Marshall found retribu-
tion an improper justification for punishment. Justice Brennan
could conceive of "no reason to believe that [the death sentence]
serves any penal purpose more effectively than the less severe pun-
ishment of imprisonment." 3 3 He found that the death sentence was
not required to reflect society's abhorrence for capital crimes. First,
it was not applied in an even-handed fashion. Moreover, society's
condemnation was apparent by application of the most severe sanc-
tion, whatever that might be. Thus, life imprisonment could ade-
quately express society's disapproval s.34  Justice Marshall held that
retribution was unacceptable as a goal not only because life impris-
onment is a less drastic alternative, but also because retribution is
simply a morally impermissible aim of the criminal law.3 14 Although
stating that retribution alone cannot justify punishment, he recog-
nized that retribution can place a limit on those who may be subject
to the criminal sanction and on the degree to which they may be
punished.3"1 Neither Brennan nor Marshall reached the burden of
proof issue on the general deterrent effect of the death penalty, since
their position was that the evidence supported the theory that the
death penalty has no greater deterrent effect than life imprison-
ment.3 148 As for specific deterrence and isolation, both found the less
severe alternative of life imprisonment equally effective. 39 There-
fore, on the basis of a need for a less drastic alternative, they found
the death penalty unconstitutional.3 1
341. Justice Brennan took the same absolutist position he had taken in Furman, arguing
that the death penalty is beneath human dignity. Id. at 230 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
342. Id. at 231-32 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
343. Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
344. Id. at 303-04 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
345. Id. at 237-38 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
346. Id. at 237 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
347. Id. at 233-36 (Marshall, J., dissenting); 408 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
348. Id. at 233-38 & n. 14 (Marshall, J., dissenting); 408 U.S. at 335 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing); 408 U.S. at 300-01 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
349. 428 U.S. at 239 (Marshall, J., dissenting); 408 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
350. In contrast, the plurality stated in Gregg:
Therefore, in assessing a punishment selected by a democratically elected legis-
lature against the constitutional measure, we presume its validity. We may not
require the legislature to select the least severe penalty possible so long as the
penalty selected is not cruelly inhumane or disproportionate to the crime involved.
And a heavy burden rests on those who would attack the judgment of the represent-
atives of the people.
Id. at 175.
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The plurality opinions in the 1976 cases did not place the burden
of proving deterrence on the legislatures or require the less restric-
tive alternative of life imprisonment. However, there is a difference
between the plurality position on deterrence and the position taken
by the four Justices (Burger, White, Blackmun and Rehnquist) who
were willing to uphold the constitutionality of a mandatory death
sentence. The four Justices were willing to defer to the legislative
judgment that the mandatory imposition of the death sentence has
a general deterrent effect. 351 The plurality Justices, however, noted
that the deterrent effect of the death penalty changes in different
cases:
We may nevertheless assume safely that there are murderers, such
as those who act in passion, for whom the threat of death has little
or no deterrent effect. But for many others the death penalty un-
doubtedly is a significant deterrent. There are carefully contem-
plated murders, such as murder for hire, where the possible pen-
alty of death may well enter into the cold calculus that precedes
the decision to act.32
By requiring individualization, either by means of bifurcated trials,
standards, appellate review or otherwise, the plurality required a
close relationship between the purposes of the legislature and the
imposition of the death sentence in each case. The relationship was
expanded further in Harry Roberts v. Louisiana, where the Court
required a consideration of mitigating as well as aggravating factors
even for the narrowly defined crime of killing a police officer.35 3 The
Court's individualizing requirements can be viewed as a less restric-
tive alternative of the Tribe structural due process approach.354
The opinion of the plurality upholding the death sentence in the
1976 discretionary cases may be narrow one. The plurality held that
the death penalty is not a form of punishment that may never be
imposed, regardless of the circumstances of the offense, regardless
of the character of the offender, and regardless of the procedure
followed in reaching the decision to impose it. .... 5
351. Id. at 358.
352. Id. at 185-86. There is some inconsistency in the plurality approach. It recognizes
that deterrence is best served in cases of premeditated murder, but approves lists which
include aggravating factors such as whether the crime was "outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible or inhuman .... Id. at 165 n. 9. The plurality thus left to be solved on a case by
case basis problems of inconsistencies among the purposes of the criminal sanction that
perhaps can never be reconciled.
353. See note 332 supra and accompanying text.
354. See note 17 supra.
355. 428 U.S. at 187.
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Considering the conflicting purposes of the criminal sanction, the
type of individualization that was required to assure that.the impo-
sition of death in each individual case fulfills the purposes of the
criminal law may be so stringent that the degree of rationality re-
quired is impossible to meet in practice.
CONCLUSION
Substantive due process, the basic mode of constitutional analy-
sis and one which establishes a dynamic pattern with its evaluation
of the propriety of legislative purposes (ends) and the relationship
of procedures to purposes (means-ends) has finally been applied,
although not by name, by the Supreme Court to three areas of
criminal law. The first and oldest line of cases, those dealing with
the constitutional necessity of culpability in the definition of crimi-
nality, an ends type of analysis, is the least clear. Specific mens rea
is "sometimes" required; a voluntary act is required; and sanity is
probably required. The Supreme Court did not take the opportunity
offered by Rivera v. Delaware to clarify the relationship, if any,
between each of these culpability elements. Although Mullaney v.
Wilbur seemed to establish constitutional limits on the definition
of criminality, the Court's decision in Patterson v. New York contin-
ues to allow the states great leeway in defining the elements of an
offense on which the state need not bear a burden of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt.
The second line of cases involves alternative rehabilitative sys-
tems of dealing with social deviance. The third line of cases involves
the death sentence. In both of these areas, the Court, not limited
by prior decisions, naturally fell into substantive due process analy-
sis. In the second line of cases, the Court had to articulate a ration-
ale for differentiating between criminal and non-criminal methods
of dealing with social deviance, an ends type of analysis. This was
necessary in order to reach the means-ends issue-whether constitu-
tionally mandated criminal procedural safeguards are applicable in
cases involving alternative rehabilitative systems of dealing with
social deviance. Although the death cases (which comprise the third
line of cases) were purportedly decided under the rubric of the
eighth amendment rather than substantive due process, an exami-
nation of the various opinions shows the application of a highly
developed form of both ends and means-ends substantive due pro-
cess analysis. A majority of the Court was unwilling to find any
legislative purpose improper, but required a high degree of relation-
ship between means and ends, including the less drastic alternative
of individualized hearings on the propriety of the death sentence
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and the consideration of mitigating as well as aggravating factors.
The requirements established by these cases should lead to a con-
tinuing trend on the part of the Court to substantively examine the
propriety of the purposes of the criminal law. Thus, substantive due
process analysis in the criminal law is alive and not doing too badly
in bringing to the criminal law a degree of rationality that has not
previously been constitutionally required.

